






















on  the  farmerʹs  price.  Chapter  two  of  this  dissertation  presents  a  theoretical 
model of commodity market  liberalization which aims  to analyze  the  impact of 
market liberalization on the farmerʹs price. This monopsony‐type model includes 
three main features often studied separately in the literature: spatial competition 
among buyers,  transaction costs, and  the  international environment. The model 
replicates the mixed results observed following commodity market liberalization. 
It also  stresses  the  fact  that  the outcome of  commodity market  liberalization  is 
ambiguous, unless the three features listed above can be controlled. 
The empirical model developed in chapter three is one of the few models 
that  take  advantage  of  the  recent  developments  in  the  field  of  spatial 
econometrics,  the  availability  of  household  survey  data,  and  geographical 
information data in order to analyze the market reforms in developing countries. 
The empirical model  tests  for price competition and  transaction costs using  the 
Generalized Spatial Two‐Stage Least Squares (GS2SLS) procedure, developed by 
Kelejian  and Prucha  (1998). The data  is  a  two‐period panel  household  survey 
data  of  rice  farmer  in  Vietnam.  The  results  show  the  presence  of  price 
competition  among  buyers  during  the  two markets  regimes.  In  addition,  the 
level  of  competition  decreases  after  the  market  liberalization.  Regarding 
transaction  costs,  proportional  transaction  costs  decrease  after  the  market 
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In the economic development literature, much has been written
about poverty reduction in developing countries. In particular, the
question of how to improve the welfare of the rural population, has
been the origin of several papers. However, little attention has been
devoted to the impact of these policies at the farmer’s level. In this
study, we take a step forward toward bridging this gap by focusing
attention on how commodity market reforms impact the farmer’s
welfare through the price he receives for his production.
The debate over whether globalization should be pushed further
in developing countries has been in the forefront of development
discussions in recent years. Besides aid flow and diverse technical
assistance received by poor countries, it is widely believed that trade
liberalization may be a solution to reducing poverty. In the last two
decades, a wave of trade liberalization has swept across many de-
veloping countries with mixed results. Domestic trade liberalization
or market liberalization, as I will refer to it the rest of the paper, is
the reduction of the role played by the government in the domestic
commodity market. In this market, more responsibility is placed on
the private sector. This market liberalization implies that, in poor
countries especially, reforms have to be implemented in one of their
most important markets: the commodity market.1 These markets
1Akiyama, Baffes, Larson and Varangis (2003) for an extensive survey of the literature on
1
are important to these countries mainly because a large share of their
population depends on commodities for a living. Furthermore, ex-
port revenue from these commodity goods typically represent more
than half of the total export revenue of the country.2
Prior to the reforms, government interventions in these markets
were due to several reasons, including: (i) the belief that the govern-
ment should be the key force driving economic development (Lewis
1954, Hirschman 1958); (ii) the taxation of this sector was easy,
and taxes were used to finance state-budget, industrial and urban
development; (iii) the importance of these markets to the country’s
economy were too vital to leave it in the hands of the private sec-
tor; and (iv) the price stabilization effect protected farmers from
international price volatility. Reforms were prompted in the mid-
1980s after the collapse of most of the commodity good prices in
the international market. The world price collapse shed light on
the mismanagement of the commodity market and countries had to
liberalize the market with the assistance of the international devel-
opment agencies.
Before further elaboration, I need to clarify what regulated and
liberalized markets for a commodity good means in this study. Reg-
ulated markets in developing countries are characterized by the pres-
commodity market reforms in Africa.
2 In 1997 for instance, agriculture export revenue as a share of total government export
revenue was 93% in Malawi, 88% in Cote d’Ivoire, 87% in Cambodia, and 64% in both
Indonesia and Benin.
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ence of heavy government marketing boards that legally control the
purchase, sale, export or import of agricultural commodities. These
marketing boards were established to allow the government to con-
trol the commodity price and to tax the agricultural sector to subsi-
dize industrialization. At the beginning of each agricultural season,
the marketing board fixed a pan-seasonal3 and pan-territorial4 single
price. The difference between the international price and the price
offered by the board mainly includes the export tax, the stabiliza-
tion funds, and the marketing board profit. In theory, the export
tax goes directly to the government budget, while the stabilization
funds is used to guarantee a minimum farmer’s price in case of an
international negative price shock, and the profit is used to develop
the commodity sector. In practice, almost all of the surplus (stabi-
lization and profit) has been used to primarily finance the urban and
industrial sectors’ development, when its management was sound.
The objective function of these boards was to maximize revenue
when selling the commodity on the world market. The combination
of the subsidies paid to farmers in remote areas,5 the high transport
cost of the commodities from these remote areas, the management
and mismanagement of the boards and the decreasing real world
3Pan-seasonal means that the commodity price is the same during all marketing seasons.
4Pan-territorial means that the commodity price is the same for all the regions of the
country. This implies that farmers in remote areas of the country may receive subsidies for
their supply. Also, this pricing scheme led to higher crop production than under the liberalized
market.
5 due to pan-territorial pricing.
3
commodity price result in unsustainable government budget deficits.
With the assistance of the international development agencies, agri-
cultural marketing reforms were initiated to reduce the role of the
government and to encourage greater private sector participation. In
certain cases, state-owned marketing boards remained in the mar-
keting system with a different and clear mandate: maximization
of profits, as does the private sector (Barrett and Mutambatsere,
2005). The implementation of these reforms leads to the liberalized
commodity market. So, market liberalization in this paper refers to
the reduction of the government’s role in the internal commodity
market, coupled with a greater role to the private sector.
The results of these reforms have been mixed. The objectives
from the reforms were not clear since most of them were preceded
by crises (Akiyama et al, 2003). In addition, when the goals of the
reforms were defined, they were difficult to measure. However, the
principal objective of these reforms was to increase the price that
farmers received for their production. This objective was expected
to be achieved through a higher share of the world price for the
farmers, and a reduction of the marketing board or private sector
profit. Other objectives of these reforms were to obtain a change
in the regional distribution of price, increase output, higher price
volatility,6 and more private sector intervention in the market to
6Higher price volatility was expected to benefit farmers, especially during positive shocks.
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finally achieve an increase in farmers’ welfare. Basically, more com-
petition and lower transaction costs should have made the farmers
better off; however, this may only be half of the story.
Chapter two of this dissertation presents a model of commodity
market liberalization that analyzes the impact of market liberal-
ization on the farmer’s price. This monopsony-type model includes
three main features often studied separately in the literature: spatial
competition among buyers, transaction costs, and the international
environment. The model replicates the mixed results observed fol-
lowing a commodity market liberalization. It also highlights the fact
that the outcome of a commodity market liberalization is ambigu-
ous, unless the three features listed above can be controlled.
The empirical model developed in chapter three is slightly related
to the theoretical model and to Pinske et al (2002). It is one of the
few models that takes advantage of the recent developments in the
field of spatial econometrics, the availability of household survey
data, and geographical information data. These recent findings aid
in the analysis of the market reforms in developing countries. I
combined comprehensive two-period panel household data with a
set of geographical information data. The survey data, I use, covers
the same households before and after the rice market liberalization
in Vietnam.
Vietnam is a good example of commodity market reforms in the
5
food sector. Before the country implemented its reforms and liber-
alized the rice sector in the late 80s, it was a net importer of rice.
By 1997, the country had become to be the second largest exporter
of rice after Thailand. The country successfully implemented eco-
nomic reforms and the results were reflected in the high average
annual economic growth rate (7%) between 1990 and 2000. Agri-
culture, specifically rice export, also increased robustly during this
period. Poverty incidence, especially, fell drastically between these
periods.
The empirical model tests for price competition and transaction
costs among buyers. Buyer’s competition means that buyers are
competing for farmer’s production. Then, a high level of competi-
tion at the buyer’s level means that farmer receives a higher price
for his/her production. The results show the presence of price com-
petition during the two market regimes. In addition, the results
show less competition after the market liberalization. The structure
of the market, the level of infrastructure, and the low education
level of the farmer are good candidates to explain price competition
reduction under market liberalization. Regarding transaction costs,
proportional transaction costs decrease after the market liberaliza-
tion, while fixed transaction costs do not affect the farmer’s price
during both market regimes. Overall, in the case of Vietnam, one
can say that liberalization of the rice sector seem to have improve
6
farmer’s welfare.
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chap-
ter two presents a model of commodity market liberalization. This
chapter discusses the farmer’s price behavior following market liber-
alization under spatial competition, transaction costs, and the inter-
national environment. An empirical model is developed in chapter
three to analyze the impact of market liberalization on the farmer’s
price. This model is tested with data from a comprehensive two-
period panel household survey from Vietnam.
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2 A model of Commodity Market Liberaliza-
tion.
2.1 Introduction
The literature on the impact of trade liberalization on farmers’ wel-
fare is ubiquitous7 but, overall, the answer is unclear. The improve-
ment of the farmer’s price through liberalization was understood as
if more private sector involvement in the commodity market meant
more competition, and therefore a reduction of transaction costs.
Competition was then defined by the number of private firms in the
commodity market, and the share of the international price received
by the farmers.
As a result of the commodity market liberalization, private sector
entry was massive, especially where the barriers to entry were low.
In a 2000 survey of the middlemen in the rice sector in Vietnam,
Hai (2002) found that among the group of entry barriers8 in the rice
market, only the lack of capital was cited as the main constraint to
entering the market. However, massive market entry by the private
sector may not be a sign of higher competition (Barrett, 1997) with
regard to the market structure.
7At least four different methodologies have been used so far in the literature to analyze
the impact of trade liberalization on poverty, including cross-country regression (Dollar and
Kraay, 2001), general-equilibrium simulation models (Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr, 2000),
micro-macro simulation models (Hertel et al, 2003) and the partial-equilibrium/cost-of-living
analysis (Deaton, 1989; Ravallion, 1990; Levinsohn, Berry, and Friedman, 1999).
8 lack of capital, lack of rice supply, unstable output market, high taxes, licences
8
Poor infrastructure in developing countries makes transaction
costs an important component of the price received by the farmer.
Transaction costs have been used to explain the labor market sup-
ply in rural areas (Eswara and Kotwa 1986, Sadoulet, De Janvry
and Benjamin 1998), the land market (Skoufias, 1995), the supply
response and food market (Varangis and Schreiber, 2001, and McIn-
tire and Varangis, 1999). Nevertheless, few papers focused on the
link between transaction costs and the farmer’s price or welfare.
From the methodological perspective, the literature has three
main shortcomings. Firstly, market structure is not well integrated
into model. As Agenor and Montiel (1996) argue, focusing on devel-
oping countries9 does not mean that economic agents are different
from the ones in the industrial countries, but simply that they evolve
in a very different environment (imperfect information, weak market
power, poor infrastructure). Secondly, by putting the spotlight on
the buyers’ price (or private sector) competition, those who should
be the final beneficiaries (farmers) of these reforms are not taken
into account in the analysis. Finally, the burden of the transaction
cost, which shifted from the government to the individual farmer,
is often ignored and it is an important component analyzing the
impact of liberalization.
9The economies of the developing countries are called dual economy because they have two
separate economic systems that coexist: a modern sector that is like advanced economies; and
a traditional sector that has circuits of production and (formal and/or informal) exchanges.
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This chapter offers an analysis of the impact of commodity mar-
ket liberalization on the farmers’ price using a monopsony-type
model. In addition to spatial competition, commodity market liber-
alization makes domestic prices more vulnerable to the international
price. If liberalization occurs while the international commodity
price has a positive trend, then its impact on the farmer’s price may
be positive; otherwise, it may be negative. Hence, the timing of the
liberalization10 is crucial. Finally, the model takes into consideration
transaction costs, which were paid collectively before liberalization
and may now increase the financial burden of the farmer, thus re-
ducing the price he received for his production. Price competition is
evaluated at the farmer’s level. The level of competition before and
after liberalization is analyzed and the effect of transaction costs on
the farmer’s price is also evaluated.
This chapter extends the present literature in two ways. First, it
is an attempt to formally explain, on theoretical grounds, the mixed
results observed in the empirical literature. Second, it includes fea-
tures that were discussed separately in the literature. In particular,
the three main features of my model are spatial competition among
buyers, transaction costs, and international environment. Besides
all of the institutional framework, these three features are key ele-
ments to understanding the liberalization phenomenon. Indeed, lib-
10which means that at the time of the liberalization, world price trend is positive or negative.
The timing is good if the trend is positive, and the timing is bad otherwise.
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eralization may increase competition among buyers, but transaction
costs may also increase thereby leaving the final effect ambiguous.
If we look at the timing of liberalization, we can understand why
liberalization may or may not be beneficial when the international
price is moving in one direction or another.
The model is designed in the following steps. The overall frame-
work of the model is presented in section 2. The first step, in section
3, models the farmer’s supply response to a price offer received by
the buyer. Once the buyer knows the farmer’s supply response, he
will design a price scheme to offer to the farmer to obtain his opti-
mum level of output to be sold on the international market (section
4). Finally, section 5 provides the last step of this model focusing on
how the buyer takes into consideration the international commodity
price behavior when he sets up the farmer’s price. The effect of
the commodity market liberalization, in terms of the farmer’s price
change, is evaluated in the last section.
2.2 Framework of the Model
The objective of this model is to analyze the farmer’s commodity
price behavior following the market liberalization in the presence
of world price variability, transaction costs and spatial competition.
The framework of the model is the following: Consider a country
divided into a finite number of markets, representing geographical
11
areas of this country. Each market (or planted area) is composed of
a continuum of agricultural households (or farmers), uniformly dis-
tributed with a density F (T )11 and has a unique buyer. Farmers pro-
duce a commodity good (staple crop), which can be auto-consumed,
sold within the country or exported to the world market through an
exporter (or buyer). For simplicity, farmers do not participate in
international trade.12 In addition, farmers are small enough to be
price-takers and receive a risk-free price of the commodity from the
buyer at the beginning of the planting season and then decide their
level of production and supply.
The model has two periods. In the first period, the commodity
market is regulated by the government, and all buyers are the State
Owned Enterprises (SOEs), depending on the government marketing
board. Under the regulated market of the first period, the govern-
ment bears the international price variability and supports trans-
action costs. In the second period, the government liberalizes the
domestic commodity market, and private buyers enter the market.
The private buyers compete for market shares through the price
they offer to the farmer for his commodity. For simplification, all
buyers in the country are identical. Each buyer has monopsonistic
11T is the radius of the market that is supposed to be circular. This is explained in detail
later on.
12They cannot export their production, which is done only by the buyers by assumption
(this does not change the main results if lifted).
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power on a circular market (Capozza and Van Order 1978)13 of ra-
dius T and faces international price variability of the commodity.14
A key feature of this model is the spatial competition among buyers
after market liberalization occurred, and the presence of transaction
costs.
2.3 Farmer’s Supply Response.
This section discusses the farmer’s commodity production and sup-
ply function response when a buyer offers him a price pf . Assume
that farmer i0s utility function u depends on the consumption of two
goods: a composite of numéraire good,15 hi, and an agricultural com-
modity or staple crop, ci. The staple crop, when produced in quan-
tity qi, can be either auto-consumed and/or sold to the buyer. At
the beginning of each planting season, the buyer (marketing board
or private buyer) informs the farmer i of the net unit price pfi he
will receive for his production. Indeed, the net unit price received
by the farmer can be written pfi = pf − sti , where pf is the unit price
of the commodity offered by the buyer at his doors and s is the cost
to transport one unit of output one unit of distance, and ti is the
13“Circles will not cover a plane while hexagons will; however, the analysis of hexagonal
market area is not materially different. Extension to hexagonal areas is straightforward and
assumption of circular market areas simplifies the investigation.” see also footnote 23.
14Another way to understand the circular market is to follow the conventional spatial theory
and assume that spatial competition occurs in n directions. Since buyers are identical, a given
buyer’s market size in one direction will be equal to the size in all other directions, say T
(Sexton, 1990). If we assume in addition that n is infinite then we have the circular market.
15 In other words, hi represents the monetary value of all the goods, other than the staple
crop.
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distance between the farmer and the buyer. The farmer then decides
the quantity of the commodity to produce, qi = q(pfi ), to consume,
ci, to use as an input, xi and to sell, mi. The farmer can sell a share
of his production to the buyer (mi > 0); be self sufficient, (mi = 0); or
buy the commodity for his own consumption (mi < 0).
Knowing that he will receive pfi as the commodity’s price, what
will be the farmer’s supply function? Farmer i0s goal is to maximize
his utility
u(ci, hi; zu) (1)
subject to
(pf − sti)mi + hi +Bi = 0 (2)
qi − xi −mi − ci = 0 (3)
G(qi, xi; zq) = 0 (4)
where ci, qi, xi ≥ 0; Bi is an exogenous transfer or other income, G
is the production technology and zu and zq represent all the other
parameters in the utility and production technology functions. The
second constraint (2) represents the cash constraint and states that
expenditures must not exceed revenues; the resource constraint (3)
means that the quantity of the good produced, qi, must equal the
quantity used as input, xi, the quantity sold, mi, and the quantity
consumed ci. The last constraint, (4), is the production technology
14
function that links inputs to output.
The solution of this problem is straightforward. Using μi, φi, and
λi as the Lagrangian multipliers, the Lagrangian of the problem is:
L = u+ μi(qi − xi −mi − ci) + λi(p
f
imi + hi +Bi) + φiG (5)
and the first order conditions for consumption (ci > 0), input (xi > 0),
and production (qi > 0) are16
∂u
∂ci









Since the farmer’s price is exogenous to the farmer, the solution
can be written as that a separable model (producer-consumer) in the
following steps: (i) profit maximization under technology constraint;
(ii) utility maximization subject to income constraint. The profit




f − sti)(qi − xi) (9)
subject to (4) . Using the Lagragian as above L = (pf−sti)(qi−xi)+φiG
16Notice that knowing the values of consumption ci, input xi, and production qi, allows us,
using equation (3) to calculate the value of the traded good mi.
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and the first order conditions are:
∂L
∂qi











The solution of the equations system (10) and (11) give the farmer
supply function, qi = qi(pfi ; zq), and xi = xi(p
f
i ; zq). The utility maxi-
mization under the income constraint pfi ci = y = p
f
i (qi−xi)+Bi yields
the consumption level as ci = ci(pfi , y, zu).
The farmer’s supply function of the commodity, which can be
both consumed and traded, has two main properties: non linearity
and asymmetric response to price. The non linearity property means
that there is a minimum price, say pfmin, under which the farmer will
not supply the buyer. In this case, the farmer may produce or buy
the commodity for his own consumption. An asymmetric response
to price occurs when the magnitude of the net response of supply to
the price decline is less than the magnitude of the net response to
the price increase. Indeed, if the farmer’s price increases, two effects
are at play. First, farmers will increase production along the static
supply curve, and second, the price increase will lead to a shift of
the linear supply curve as new technologies (or new investments)
are used. When the price decreases, technology may not be undone,
16
thus the supply response will be only along the new static supply
curve.17




min and qi = 0
if pfi ≤ p
f
min. I assume that all farmers have the same supply function
q(.), continuous, monotically increasing and at least a twice differ-
entiable function of the farmer’s price.18 The aggregate commodity
supply by farmers on one buyer’s market is then:19
Q(pf , T ) =
Z
market
q(pf − sti)dF = 2π
Z T
0
F (t)tq(pf − st)dt
Notice that there is no index i in the last equation since the in-
tegral is done for all farmers located at distance t from the buyer.
Figure 1 displays the production, the demand, and the supply func-
tions of a farmer. A clear distinction is made between the farmer’s
production and supply. If the price P f is too low (P f < P f0 < P
f
min),
the farmer will not produce and will buy the commodity on the
market for his own consumption (demand part of the graph), and
in this case, demand is positive and supply is zero. At an interme-
diary price (P f0 < P f < P
f
min), the farmer will produce the autarky
17These 2 effects, especially the asymmetric response, may applied to multi year crop such
cocoa and coffee, but not necessarily to one year/season crop such as rice.
18The supply function is positive on the interval [P fmin,+∞) and zero between [0, P
f
min) ,
where P fmin is the minimum price at which the farmer supplies a positive quantity of good to
the market.
19The market is the area of a disk of radius T . Farmer i production is qi = q(pf − sti).
Then the total production on the circle of radius t is qt = 2πtqi, where qi is the production
of each farmer located at distance t from the buyer. Total production supply on the market





level (Qautarky), demand is zero and supply is still zero. When the
farmer’s price is above a minimum price (pfmin), there is an incentive
for the farmer to produce and production is then above the autarky
level and supply is then positive.
Proposition 1 : If the individual supply function is concave and the
radius of the market is a linear function of the farmer’s price, then
the aggregate supply function is also concave and displays the asym-
metry response property.
Proof. : Concavity of the aggregate supply function.








tF (t)q(pf − st)dt (P1)






is concave with respect to pf , we just have






, with respect to
pf , is negative. I use the Leibnitz’s rule20 to calculate this derivative.













tF (t)q0(pf − st)dt (P2)
Since q() and ∂T
∂pf
are positive, the first derivative of Q is also positive,
which means that aggregate supply is a not a decreasing function of





f(x, z)dx = f(b (z) , z)∂b(z)
∂z










































tF (t)q”(pf − st)dt (P4)
In the special case of uniform density function F (t) = ρ, where ρ
is a constant, and ∂
2T
∂(pf )2




























q(pf − sT )− q(pf )
¢
Since q[pf−sT ]−q[pf ] < 0 and q0[pf−sT ] > 0, ∂
2Q(pf ,T(pf)
∂(pf )2
< 0 if and only
if 2 ∂T
∂pf
− 1s < 0, which is equivalent to
∂T
∂pf
< 12s . Notice that under a
regulated and liberalized market ∂T
∂pf
≥ 0 then using equation (17) , it
is obvious that ∂T
∂pf
< 12s and the aggregate supply is also concave. It
then has the asymmetry response properties like the farmer’s supply
function.
Once the farmer’s supply response is known, the next step is to
analyze how the buyer will set up the price he will offer to the farmer
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to reach his desired output level. The next section first discusses the
price formation under a regulated market and then focuses on the
liberalized market regime. It is important to make this distinction
since the buyer’s maximization program is different for each market
regime. In the regulated market, the buyer is the government and
in the liberalized one, the buyer is the private sector. Since the
monopsonist is the only buyer of the output, the price pf , he offers,
must not be viewed as exogenous. Each buyer buys the commodity
from all farmers on his market and sells it on the world market. The
buyer is in the middle of his market and, transportation costs from
the buyer to the port are assumed to be zero for simplification and
without loss of generality.21
2.4 Farmer’s Price Formation
When the buyer is setting the farmer’s price, an important element
to take into consideration is the nature of the market in which the
price is decided. Buyers are different depending on the market
regime. The buyer is a public body under the regulated market
while it is a private firm/agent in liberalized regimes. Depending on
the market regime, the buyer’s objective function will be different.
The following paragraphs discuss how the buyer sets up the farmer’s
price depending on the market regime.
21 In the empirical model, each buyer will be located at different ports within the country.
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Regulated Market: Under the regulated market, the SOE, through
the marketing board is the only buyer. In this regime, the objec-
tive function of the SOE is to maximize profit subject to: (i) keep
most of the farmers in business; and (ii) avoid asking for subsidy
to the government. The first constraint is due to the social role of
the government. Since most of the population is living in the rural
area, keeping most the farmers in business is a form of income re-
distribution. The second constraint means that the government will
let the very high cost farmers go out of business. Several methods
may allow the SOE to solve its maximization problem. Empirical
evidences show that the SOE offers the same price to all farmers in
business and pays for the transport cost of the commodity. I will
also assume this solution here.
In this market regime, a State Owned Enterprise (SOE) is the
buyer in any given market. Buyers do not compete since the gov-
ernment fixes a uniform farmer’s price and the market size for each
buyer (or SOE). Hence, the market size for each buyer is indepen-
dent of the farmer’s price i.e. ∂T
∂pf
= 0. In this case, there is no spatial
competition.
The buyer faces an increasing commodity supply curve that re-
lates pf to the total domestic production Qd. Since the price offered
is the same for all farmers, the production of farmer i is then in-
dependent of the distance between the farmer and the buyer. The
21
profit made by the buyer on farmer i is then: Ωi = pwqi(pf ) − ci(qi)
where ci(qi) = pfqi(pf )+stiqi(pf ) is the cost of purchasing output q(pf )
from farmer i, pw is the exogenous world price of the commodity, pf is
the commodity’s price at the buyer’s doors, and sti is the transac-
tion cost that is assumed to be only the transportation cost22 , s is
the cost to transport one unit of output one unit of distance, and ti
is the farmer-buyer distance. The aggregate profit of the marketing
board on a circle of radius t is then Ωt = 2πtΩi, where Ωi is the profit
function from farmer i located at distance ti from the buyer. Thus,
















Notice that Q(pf , T ) = πT 2q(pf ) is23 the aggregate output pur-
chased by the marketing board on its market and 23sT is the average
transport cost per farmer. Indeed, the total unit cost for all farmers




3 = πT 2(23sT ), where
πT 2 is the area measure of the market and 23sT represents the av-
erage unit cost per farmer. Since there is no spatial competition,
22For simplification, I assume that the transport cost is the only proportional transaction
cost (PTC), and fixed transaction costs (search cost, bargain cost,...) are assumed to be equal
to zero.
23 I can also rewrite Q(pf , T ) = πT 2q(pf ) = Aq(pf ) where A = πT 2 is the market area of
the buyer and q(pf ) is the average production of the farmers in this market. The assumption
of a circular market can now be easily lifted. If the market is square-shaped with length a,
total production will be Q(pf , T ) = Aq(pf ) where A = a2. The same logic holds.
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each buyer or "marketing board" will then maximize its profit with













where pfR is the price received by the farmer.24 The net price received
by farmer i is also pfRi = p
f
R. The term on the right hand side (RHS)









is the average unit transport cost paid by the buyer for one unit of
the commodity. It is easy to see this average transport cost as a
redistribution mechanism. Indeed, farmers located up to 23T of the
market radius, pay a "tax", which is used as a "transport subsidy"
for farmers located between 23T and T . In the regulated market,
farmers located far away from the buyer stay in business mainly
because they received a subsidy from the government.
Liberalized market: In the liberalized market, buyers are private
agents and their objective function is different from the SOEs. Two
main differences exist between the liberalized market and the reg-
24This result of transport costs supported by all the farmers is corroborated by the real
life examples in the developing countries. To reduce regional disparities (generally between
the capital city that is most of the time on the coast and the other regions of the country),
governments in developing countries put a transport tax on the commodity’s price such that
the price of the commodity is the same throughout the country. For instance in the Ivory
Coast, the retail price of gas in Abidjan (the capital), where oil is refined, is the same as in
the north of country (about 500 miles away), which imports the gas from Abidjan.
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ulated one. Firstly, each farmer receives a different price for his
production, mainly because transport costs are supported this time
by the farmers. A farmer i receives a net price pfi = pf − sti for one
unit of his production,25 where pf is the commodity price at the
buyer’s doors. Secondly, buyers can compete for market size. In
the liberalized market regime, each market has a private buyer with
monopsony power. However, due to spatial competition, each buyer
can increase his market size only by offering a higher farmer’s price
than his neighbor and therefore ∂T
∂pf
> 0. Even though questions re-
garding the optimal number of buyers and their optimal locations
are interesting issues, they will not be addressed here, and they do
not affect the main results of the model.
When offered a price pfi , farmer i, located at the distance ti from
the buyer, produces a quantity qi = q(pfi ) of the commodity. Total
cost supported by the buyer is pfQ(pf , T ). The buyer’s gross rev-
enue,26 following the sale to the world market, is G(Q). The buyer27
will choose pf to maximize his profit, which is given by
π = G(Q(pf , T (pf )))− pfQ(pf , T (pf )) (14)
25Another way to present the net price is to assume that the buyer offers the same farmer’s
price to all farmers in his market and farmers pay for the delivery cost of their production.
26 I assume gross revenue for simplicity. This assumption can be lifted without changing the
main results.
27Following the discussion on farmer output supply, the buyer can obtain any amount of
output, Q(pf , T ) by offering the right level of the farmer ’s price, pf . The supply response,
q(pf − sti), of the farmer is positively correlated to pf . This will rule out the condition under
which the buyer buys an infinite level of output.
24







Q(pf , T (pf ))
¤




Q(pf , T (pf ))
¤
(15)
The left hand side (LHS) of equation (15) is the total marginal
gross revenue (MGR) of the buyer. It is the product of the marginal
revenue, G0(Q), due to the purchase of one additional unit of Q and










the monopsonist due to the change of the farmer’s price pf . The RHS
is the total marginal cost (MC) of the commodity bought when an
extra unit is purchased. It has two components: (i) Q(pf , T ), which




, which is the cost of the additional units of the
commodity bought due to a change of the farmer’s price.
If the buyer resells the commodity to the world market at a unit
price,28 pw(Qw), then, G(Qd) = pwQd and the FOC (15) becomes
pf = pw − Q(p







The second term on the RHS of (16) is also the mark-up price, as






captures the supply effect due to a change of the price offered to the
28 I assume that pw in the static model is exogenous and constant. This assumption is lifted
later on.
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farmers. The spatial competition among monopsonists is captured








private buyer will offer a unit price pf at his doors, while the farmer
i will receive a net price pf − sti.
The derivative ∂T
∂pf
can be seen as the spatial competition index.
A farmer, located at the border of two markets, A and B, will be
indifferent between selling his production to buyer A or B, if the
net price he receives from each of them is the same. If the distance
between A and B is M ; and the price offer by A is pfi = pf−sT while B
offerscpfi =cpf−s(M−T ). Then the indifference equation for the farmer
is: pf−sT =cpf−s(M−T ). It implies that T = (2s)−1 (pf−cpf+sM). Then,
the market size radius of a buyer is a function of transportation costs,
distance between buyers, and the gap between his own price and the










Equation (17) expresses the buyer’s belief about the price response
of the neighboring buyer to his own price change. Therefore, a
liberalized market means that ∂cpf
∂pf
< 1.29 Let’s α = ∂T
∂pf




= 0, we are in the case of Hotelling-Smithies spatial competition where there
is no reaction from the neighboring rival following a price change. In this spatial competition





price received by farmer i in the liberalized regime is:
pfLi = p
w − Q(p





Several factors, besides the quantity produced, can increase the
farmer’s price under the liberalized market. These factors include





, and a reduced transport or
transaction cost (lower s).
A regulated market means that ∂cpf
∂pf
= 1. This is equivalent to a
Loschian spatial competition,30 which means that any price change
made by a buyer is expected to be matched by its neighboring rival.
The main difference between the regulated and liberalized market
regime, besides spatial competition, is the net price received by the
farmer. In the regulated regime, the farmer’s price is net of the
constant average transport cost, while in the liberalized regime the
farmer’s price is net of the individual transport cost.
I can lift the zero transportation cost from the buyer to the
port and obtain similar formulas as follows. Assume that the cost
function of the buyer, besides the purchase of the farmer’s produc-
tion, is c(Q) = pfQ + m(Q) + f where m(Q) is the transport cost to
30 In a Loschian competition, each buyer assumes his market size to be fixed and sets the
farmer’s price as a monopoly (Capozza and Van Order, 1979), then ∂T
∂pf
= 0. This type of
competition can be seen as the spatial equivalent of a noncompetitve oligopoly.
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the port and f is a fixed cost. The profit function of the buyer
when selling his purchase Q to the international market is π =
pwQ(pf , T (pf )) − c(Q(pf , T (pf )) where pw is the international price of
the commodity. The first order condition ∂π
∂pf



























pf = (pw − ∂m
∂Q
)− Q(p







and writing cpw = pw − ∂m∂Q gives exactly the same formula, as if the
transport costs were zero. cpw is then the world price of the com-
modity net of marginal non-raw processing costs (Sexton, 1990).
Equations (13) and (18) give the net price received by the farmer
in each market regime. For simplification, these equations assume
the world price is constant. Before the analysis of the farmer’s price
change after market liberalization, the last step of the model is to lift
the assumption of a constant world price and to analyze its behavior.
This is the purpose of the next section.
2.5 Commodity World Price Behavior
This section derives a formal behavior model of the international
commodity price based on Sir Lewis (1954), and Deaton and Laroque
(2003). A good model of commodity price behavior should replicate
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most of the features of these prices. Empirical studies have shown
that commodity prices are highly auto-correlated, and display high
variability, skewness31 and kurtosis32 (Deaton and Laroque, 1996).
Two methods are available in the literature to describe the behavior
of prices: time-series modelling and the more traditional supply and
demand method.
The supply and demand method is used in this paper33 to analyze
the behavior of commodity prices. Commodity prices’ autocorrela-
tion can be explained by the demand side, which is auto-correlated.
The Lewis’ model (1954) is used for the supply side of the model.34
Assume a partial equilibrium model where the (log of) world de-
mand, dw, of a tradable commodity is a log-linear function of the
(log of) world income, yt, and of the (log of) world price of the
commodity, pwt
dwt = K +Ayt −Bpwt + εdt (21)
31Skewness is a measure of the lack of symmetry of a distribution (and any symmetric
distribution should have a skewness equal to zero, like the normal distribution). Negative
values for the skewness indicate data that are skewed left (which means that the left tail is
heavier than the right tail) and positive values for the skewness indicate data that are skewed
right (the right tail is heavier than the left tail). The skewness measure is μ3/ (μ2)
1.5 , where
μr is the r
th moment.
32Kurtosis is a measure of whether the distribution are peaked or flat relative to a normal
distribution. Thus, a distribution with high kurtosis tends to have a distinct peak near the
mean, decline rather rapidly, and have heavy tails. A distribution with low kurtosis tends to







where μr is the rth moment. The normal distribution has a kurtosis of zero. Positive kurtosis
indicates a "peaked" distribution and negative kurtosis indicates a "flat" distribution.
33mainly because of data constraint.
34Lewis’ concern was to explain why the sugar’s price relative to imported manufactured
goods were constant or decreasing. The solution was an "unlimited supply of labor" that will
keep wages down, and producing a cheap commodity under the tropics.
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where yt is a nonstationary integrated process of order 1, I(1),35
A > 0, B > 0, K are parameters, and εdt is a stationary, unobservable
random variable. Hence, demand is an increasing function of the
world income, and a decreasing function of the commodity’s price.
Regarding the supply, the equation is based on Lewis (1954) and
does not include the world income since the empirics show that
commodity prices are low while world demand and income are in-





t − p∗) + εst (22)
where swt is the log of the world supply, M, a parameter and εdt is a
stationary, unobservable supply random shock and p∗ is the marginal
cost of production on the marginal land and is constant following
Lewis’ assumption of an unlimited labor supply in developing coun-
tries. Since the model ignores inventory and competitive storage of
the commodity, the equilibrium world price is determined by equal-
izing the supply (22) and the demand (21), dwt = swt then
pwt = (B +M)
−1 £K +Ayt +Mp∗ − swt−1 + εdt − εst¤ (23)
35which means that ∆yt ~I(0).
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Plugging pwt from eq. (23) into (22) leads to
swt = (B +M)
−1[MK +MAyt −MBp∗ +Bswt−1 +Mεdt +Bεst ] (24)
which can be written
∆swt = (B+M)
−1[MA∆yt+M(Ayt−1−swt−1)+MK−MBp∗+Mεdt+Bεst ] (25)
where ∆swt = swt − swt−1 and ∆yt = yt − yt−1. Using eq. (23) , swt−1 will be
swt−1 = K +Ayt +Mp
∗ − (B +M)pwt + εdt − εst (26)
and moving eq. (26) one period ahead gives:
swt = K +Ayt+1 +Mp
∗ − (B +M)pwt+1 + εdt+1 − εst+1 (27)
Eliminating supply of the previous period by plugging equation (26)
and (27) into equation (24) and writing the price as a function of its
previous period value and the world income growth yields:
pwt − p∗ = (B +M)−1
£




pwt − p∗ = θ(pwt−1 − p∗) + α∆yt + μt (29)
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with θ = B(B +M)−1, α = A(B +M)−1 and μt = (B +M)−1(∆εst − εdt ).
Equation (29) shows that the commodity price is stationary and its
long run value is α(1 − θ)−1E(∆yt). However, in the short-run, price
will respond to demand and supply shocks. The commodity world
price at time t, pwt , is then a function of its previous value (pwt−1) and
of the world income growth ∆yt. Indeed, α is supposed to be positive
since an increase of the world price income will push up the demand
for the commodity.
The behavior of the commodity world price represents the effect
of the international environment and it also captures the effective-
ness of the timing of the market liberalization. An increasing world
price means good timing for liberalization since the impact of the
world price’s change on the farmer’s price is likely to be positive.
However, few governments will liberalize at this moment because of
the profit they can easily make in this sector while farmers receive a
"regulated" price. In the case of a negative shock of the world price,
which represents bad timing for liberalization, the government may
decide to liberalize to avoid paying subsidy to farmers, if the regu-
lated price tends to be higher than the world’s price.
To come back to our point of interest, the impact of the world
commodity price, consider two periods where the regulated market
regime is period 1 and the liberalized regime is period 2. The world
price pw1 in period 1 is known and the world price fpw2 in period 2
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is random. In period 1, the buyer has to forecast the world’s price
in period 2 before he sets the farmer’s price. For simplification,
I assume that the buyer has a simple forecast function, which is
defined as found above36 ,
fpw2 = θpw1 + α∆yt + μ (30)
where μ is a random variable such that μ˜N(0, σ2) and θ (0 < θ < 1)
is the coefficient of expectation for the future. If the buyers have
a high expectation for the second period price, then θ is close to
1, otherwise θ is close to 0. Indeed, in most cases, the buyer will
anticipate that liberalization occurs at a bad time, when the world
price is likely to decrease, so he will choose θ close to 0. The expected
world price in period 2 is then
E
³fpw2 ´ = pw2 = θpw1 + αE(∆yt) (31)
Equation (31) shows that the expected world’s price forecasted
by the buyer depends on the previous period world’s price and the
world’s growth rate. If the world’s economy experiences a positive
growth rate, the demand for the commodity may increase and the
price will also increase (I assume a constant world’s production and
a small country case).
36 I assume p∗ = 0 for simplification.
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The previous four sections explained in detail the determination
of the price a farmer receives for his commodity under two different
market regimes: regulated and liberalized. Also, the behavior of
the world commodity price has been analyzed. The next section
will put all these results together and compare the price impact of
commodity market liberalization.
2.6 Price Effect of the Commodity Market Liberalization
The objective of this model is to analyze the farmer’s price behavior,
due to commodity market liberalization and ultimately, evaluate its
effects in term of farmers’ welfare. An important difference between
the regulated and liberalized market regimes is that the transaction
costs are shifted from a commonly supported cost, through govern-
ment intervention, to an individually supported cost by each farmer.
In addition, in the liberalized market, spatial competition should
push the buyer to offer a higher farmer’s price, while in the regu-
lated market, the farmer’s price is reduced by the average transport
cost.
Under the regulated market regime, all the farmers receive the















where pfRi is the net price received by the farmer and pw1 is the world
price in period 1. Conversely, under the liberalized regime, each
farmer receives a different price since he has to support the trans-













where pfLi is the net price received by farmer i, and epw2 is the world
price in period 2. If the world price is the same and constant in both

















where pbR and pbL are the commodity prices at the buyer’s doors under
the regulated and liberalized regimes, respectively. Then,













´ > 0 (34)
Equation (34) states that the commodity’s price under the liberalized
market is higher than under the regulated market. In the present
case, only prices at the buyers doors are considered. Then, liber-
alization seems beneficial for the farmers. This result is mostly due
35
to the spatial competition that happens after the market liberaliza-
tion.37
However, if we consider the net price received by the farmer, with
constant world’s price under both regimes, the liberalized price is
not always higher than the regulated one.38 Indeed,


















T − ti) (35)
Since the first term on the RHS of (35) is always positive, the sign of
∆pf depends on the sign and magnitude of s( 23T−ti). Farmers located
up to 2/3 of the market radius (farmers closed to the buyer) will
receive higher net price under the liberalized market while farmers
located farther away may receive a lower net price. In this case, the
positive spatial competition effect may be reduced or cancelled by
the negative transaction cost effect. With two features at play, the
result is already ambiguous.
In this benchmark model, with a constant world price in both
periods, the immediate effect of liberalization may be negative for
farmers located in the remote area, and who are most likely to be
poor.
Another way to understand the market regime change effect is to
37The only effect, in this case, is the spatial competition effect, which is the only feature at
play with a positive outcome in terms of the farmer’s price change.
38 In the regulated market, the price offered by the govenment is also the net price received
by the farmers.
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(13) and (18) can be rewritten in terms of elasticity by dividing both






























is the own-price elasticity of the production supply fac-
ing the buyer; εT = ∂ lnT∂ ln pf is the elasticity of the market size with
respect to the farmer’s price and εQT = ∂ lnQ∂ lnT is the elasticity of the
production supply with respect to the market size. In the standard
monopsony model, εQ is the key to measuring monopsony power,39
and summarizes the extent to which a buyer may reduce the farmer’s
price below the competitive level. Incidentally, in this model, per-
fect competition is not possible since ρR, and ρL are always greater
than 0.
Similarly, I can estimate the mark-up ratio difference between
39The degree of monopsony power can be measured by the elasticity of output supply,
ε = (dQ/dpf )(pf/Q) with 0 < ε <∞. If ε→∞, the output Q market is perfectly competitive
and monopsony does not exit. It may be noted that the lower is the value of ε, the higher is
the monopsony power (Shieh and Yeh, 2004).
37
these two regimes
∆ρ = ρR − ρL =
εT εQT









Equation (38) shows that the sign of the mark up ratio difference
depends on the transaction cost in terms of the farmer’s price in
each regime.
In this special case where the commodity world price is the same
in both regimes, transaction costs, represented here by only the
transport cost, plays an important role. In the regulated market,
transaction costs are supported collectively, while in the liberalized
one, most of the transaction costs are supported individually, which
impacts the net price the farmer receives. This simple special case
shows how important transaction costs and spatial competition are
when discussing market liberalization.
Now, I will discuss the more general case with a non constant
commodity world price. The buyer has to forecast in period 1 what
the world’s price will be in period 2, using the forecast function
displayed in equation (30) . The farmer’s price under the regulated
market is still the same as in equation (32) , but the farmer’s price















where fpw2 is the same as in equation (30) . The expected farmer’s price




























´ + αE(∆yt) + s[ 2
3
T − ti] (41)
40The impact of commodity market liberalization in this general case





. Equation (41) displays the three effects that
can impact the farmer’s price following the market liberalization:
(i) the spatial competition, the second term in equation (41), which
has a positive impact on the farmer’s price; (ii) the transaction costs
effect, represented by the transportation cost effect s[23T − ti], those
signs depend on the location, or generally, on the characteristics of
the farmer. If we assume a positive growth rate of the world income,




finally depends only on the sign and magnitude
of φ = s[23T − ti]. For farmers close to the buyer, φ is likely to be pos-
40An interresting question is to evaluate the impact of liberalization on the average farmer.
We consider in this paper that the average farmer is the one paying the average transport
cost. In this case, the average farmer will be located at 2/3 of the radius of the market.
The price difference of this farmer will be such that the fourth term of equation (41) is zero.
Liberalization is likely to havea positive effect on the average farmer.
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itive, which means the impact of market liberalization may increase
the farmer’s price; and (iii) the international environment, repre-
sented by (θ−1)pw1 +αE(∆yt), this impact can be positive or negative,
depending on the magnitude of each term. If the world income
growth is high enough to offset the negative impact of (θ−1)pw1 , then
the impact of the international environment on the farmer’s price
following market liberalization is positive. Otherwise, if the world
income growth is small or negative, the international environment
will negatively impact the farmer’s price.
2.7 Conclusion
The paper develops a theoretical model of commodity market liber-
alization to analyze the farmer’s price behavior. This model extends
the present literature by combining three features that are generally
analyzed separately: spatial competition, transaction costs, and in-
ternational price variability. These three features show that market
liberalization does not ensure a farmer’s price increase, and thus
welfare improvement. From this model, the farmer’s price may in-
crease in at least three cases: if spatial competition is at work, if
the timing of the liberalization is good or if transaction costs do not
increase.
First, spatial competition at work means that the mark-up price
decreases. Spatial competition is the only feature which unambigu-
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ously improves the farmer’s price. Even if the market is liberalized,
the main entry barrier, access to credit or capital, may restrict the
number of private firms in the sector, and then reduce competition.
Second, good timing of liberalization is equivalent to increasing
the world price during the liberalization. When the international
commodity’s price has a positive trend, market liberalization is likely
to benefit farmers. However, governments have less incentive to lib-
eralize the market since the SOE would be more likely to make a
profit. When the international price trend is negative, the govern-
ment can run a budget deficit since it may have to subsidize the
farmer’s price if the world price is lower than the farmer’s price.
The government may liberalize the commodity market, leading to
all of the mixed results discussed above.
Finally, lower transaction costs will reduce the mark-up price
and then improve the farmer’s price. In this chapter, transaction
costs have been reduced to transportation costs, but in practice
they include search costs, negotiation costs, information costs, stor-
age costs, and technical assistance. Since most of the farmers have
almost no education, information costs, for instance, are very ex-
pensive for them. When the market is liberalized, farmers will bear
these costs. Hence, instead of observing a reduction in transaction
costs due to competition, these costs may actually increase because
of the market’s structure. This structure includes uneducated and
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poor farmers, a poor transportation and communication infrastruc-
ture and rich buyers. The market power is then in the hands of the
buyers who can easily set the prices. Finally, farmers may have to
support higher transaction costs leading to welfare reduction.
Some important policy guidance may be derived from this model.
Commodity market liberalization may yield rapid results in terms
of government budget deficit relief, but from the farmer’s viewpoint,
the story is different. An appropriate legal and institutional frame-
work to reshape the market structure can be developed to offer farm-
ers a wide array of tools combining information access, transporta-
tion facilities and market access. These tools might help absorb
farmers’ vulnerability when the market is liberalized. If commodity
market liberalization comes with no government actions to ease its
drawbacks, most of the poorest farmers, located in remote areas, will
be the first to be hurt. Consequently, along with reshaping the mar-
ket structure, commodity market policies should keep a minimum
role for the government and should also aim to increase productiv-
ity of farmers in remote areas or help them diversify their crops or
activities.
In practice, when we analyze the farmer’s price from a household
survey, the net prices received by farmers, even in the regulated
market regime, are different for each farmer. This seems to contra-
dict with the theoretical model suggested above. The next chapter
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will develop an empirical model closer to what is observed. The
model will be then tested for the features described above utilizing
the household survey data from Vietnam.
The theoretical model in this chapter represents an abstraction
of the commodity market before and after liberalization in Vietnam
that I discuss in the next chapter. However, this model captures
some features and gives some general guidance about market liber-
alization. A weakness of the theoretical model is that the middleman
is missing in the framework. In practice, the middleman plays an
intermediary role between the farmer and the exporter/buyer. The
middleman buys the farmer’s production and resells it to the ex-
porter in both regimes. The middleman is then the one receiving
a uniform unit price under the regulated market while the farmer
receives a differentiated unit price. Under the liberalized market,
even the middleman receives a differentiated unit price. The em-
pirical model in the next chapter improves the theoretical model by
integrating the middleman in the market structure. As a result, the
farmer will receive a differentiated price in both regimes.
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3 The Effect of Rice Market Liberalization on
the Farmer’s Price: Evidence from Vietnam
3.1 Introduction
Several developing countries liberalized their domestic commodity
market because of the drop of the international price during the
1980s and 1990s. The objectives of these liberalizations were twofold.
The first one was to reduce or avoid a government fiscal deficit by
paying "subsidies" directly to farmers. The fiscal problem was the
trigger of commodity marketing reforms, including liberalization,
and was primarily supported by donor countries and international
development agencies. When the commodity market was regulated
by the government, the farmer’s price did not closely track the in-
ternational price and when the world price dropped, the government
was left offering the higher domestic price, instead of the lower world
price. These "subsidies" caused fiscal deficits, which were unsustain-
able by governments.
The second objective was to ensure that the farmer would receive
a higher proportion of the world price, and also to align incentives
to the world price (Gilbert and Varangis, 2003). This objective
should be reached through a reduction of (explicit or implicit) export
taxes and an increase in efficiency of the production and marketing
channel.
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The goals of the liberalization were to solve the government’s fis-
cal deficit and to improve the farmer’s welfare. The first goal was
easily achieved once the government limited its role in the commod-
ity market and stopped paying "subsidies" to farmers. However, the
achievement of the second goal - improving the farmer’s welfare- is
still questionable. The commodity market literature contained a
ubiquitous discussion of the impact of liberalization on the farmer’s
welfare. In particular, several authors41 analyzed the impact of var-
ious market reforms, including liberalization, on the farmer’s wel-
fare, generally at an aggregate farmer level (representative farmer vs
other household groups). Paradoxically, little research has been de-
voted to the welfare impact of liberalization at the individual farmer
level, due mainly to the lack of adequate data and a theoretical
framework.
This chapter presents one step in that direction as it aims to
understand how the farmer’s welfare changes when liberalization
occurs. By solving the two main constraints that used to limit the
estimation of the liberalization impact on the farmer’s welfare (at
farmer’s level), I hope to shed some light on the nature of the ef-
fect of liberalization and draw some policy implications for poverty
alleviation in poor countries. The first constraint is the data con-
straint. Estimating the impact of commodity market liberaliza-
41 see footnote 7.
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tion on the farmer’s welfare, requires at least two point-periods of
farmer/household survey data. In addition, commodity market lib-
eralization should have occurred between these two periods. Hence,
we will be able to estimate the farmer’s welfare change over two
periods where commodity market liberalization occurs. The sec-
ond constraint is the lack of a theoretical framework that will take
into consideration the three main features that are likely to play an
important role in the process: the spatial price competition, trans-
action costs and the international environment.
This chapter solves these two constraints and estimates the im-
pact of rice market liberalization in Vietnam on the farmer’s welfare.
The first constraint - lack of data - is not an issue for Vietnam since
it implemented two household surveys42 in 1992/93 and 1997/98,
with 1,017 farmers being interviewed in both years.43 In addition,
the country reformed and liberalized its rice sector in 1993, just after
the first survey.
The second constraint is also partially solved by the model de-
veloped in chapter 2.44 This model, which analyzes the impact of
42 see appendix 2 for a description of the survey data.
43Out of 4,800 households interviewed in 1992/93 and 6,000 in 1997/98, about 4,300 house-
holds were interviewed in both years. Among these 4,300 households, 1,017 were farmers with
rice marketing surplus.
44Notice that the standard of living or welfare of many farmers in developing countries,
especially in Vietnam, depends on the sale of commodity crops (coffee, rice,...) for export.
The price the farmers receive for their outputs has major implications for their welfares. If the
farmer receives a high price for his production, his income will increase and thus the welfare.
Therefore, the analysis of the farmer’s price done in chapter 2 is completely relevant for the
welfare analysis of the farmer.
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spatial price competition, transaction costs and the world price on
the farmer’s price, is a good framework for the empirical analysis.
Unfortunately, the model has at least two major limitations. It as-
sumes that, in the regulated market regime, all farmers receive the
same price for their production from the SOE, and there are no
middlemen. However, the analysis of the market structure and the
farmer’s price survey data show that this is not the case. Farmers
receive different prices for their production, mainly due to the inter-
vention of middlemen in the marketing system. Indeed, under the
regulated market, the SOEs offer a unique price, but to the middle-
men.45 Once they receive the unique price from the SOE, they will
offer a differentiated price to the farmer based on transaction costs
(transport cost, search cost, negotiation skill, and level of infrastruc-
ture around the farmer’s location). This theoretical model will then
be modified such that it will consider the effective price received
by the farmers, which is captured in any household/farmer survey,
and not the unique price offered to the middlemen. Once these con-
straints are solved, the analysis of the market’s liberalization impact
on the farmer’s welfare answers the question of whether (and how)
the three features (spatial competition, transaction costs and the
international environment) identified in the conceptual framework
45Middlemen play a crucial role in the commodity marketing system since they are the link
between producer/farmer and the export firm or the retail seller. In Vietnam, more than 90
percent of the rice marketing surplus was collected by middlemen according to the 1992/93
and 1997/98 survey.
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impact the farmer’s price.
This chapter is related to Pinske et al (2002), who investigate the
nature of price competition among firms in a differentiated product
market and Kapoor (2003), who analyzes price competition in the
US gasoline market. In this paper, I add three main innovations to
the literature. First, this chapter analyzes the impact of commod-
ity market liberalization at the farmer’s level. Second, it combines
household survey data and geographic information data to allow
the estimation of transaction costs and spatial competition effects
after market liberalization. Finally, it is one of the few papers on
commodity market liberalization that take advantage of recent de-
velopments in spatial econometrics to estimate these effects.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The next
section provides a detailed description of the empirical model. The
data and estimation results are presented in section three. Robust-
ness tests of the empirical estimation are performed in section four.
3.2 Empirical Model
Empirical evidence indicates that the role of middlemen is impor-
tant in the commodity marketing channel. The middlemen serve as
intermediary agents whose role is to provide transaction services be-
tween farmers and the SOEs or the private exporters.46 In the case
46 In the Philliphines for instance, Hayami et al (1999) find that around 75 percent of the
rice marketing surplus was collected by the middlemen (collectors) before it reached the rice
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of Vietnam, Table 1 gives the percentage of farmers, among those
who produce and sell their rice production to individual buyers or
cooperative during the two surveys. Among these farmers, less than
one percent said that they sold their production to a government
office or to a cooperative, while more than 99 percent acknowledge
that their production was bought by an individual. Hence, at the
farmer’s level, either market regime does not matter for the way
the production is sold. In each market regime, the farmer faces the
middleman.47 In addition, previous studies used to take the price
that the middleman obtains from the export firm to analyze the im-
pact of market liberalization on the farmer’s welfare. This may be
misleading since there is an important gap between the middleman
and the farmer’s price. It is then necessary to develop a model that
corrects these weaknesses.48
This section indeed develops an empirical model that corrects
the weaknesses of the theoretical model. This model includes the
effective price received by the farmer and is then used to test the
impact of market liberalization in Vietnam. Doing so does not mean
mills. In Uganda, about 85 percent of the coffee production was purchased by middlemen
(Fafchamps and Hill, 2005).
47The main difference comes from the middleman. After they receive a unique and fixed
price from the SOE under the regulated market regime, middlemen will offer a differentiated
price to farmers because of transaction costs and profit seeking.
48Notice that the empirical model in this chapter holds even if the government is the only
exporter under the liberalized regime under two conditions: (i) the domestic purchase of
the commodity is liberalized, such as private firms or middlemen can freely purchase the
production and resell it to the government for export; and (ii) the government does not fix
the commodity price for the whole marketing season, but price varies with the international
price over the marketing season. This is a lower level of market liberalization, but this will
not change the main results of the model.
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that we analyze if we have price competition after liberalization at
the farmer’s level. This model goes beyond the existence of the
price competition. Because of the presence of middlemen in both
markets, there is competition before and after liberalization, as the
model will show. The market structure and characteristics (low
level of infrastructure, low education of farmers in addition) make
it difficult for farmers to reach the market to sell their production.
They rely to the middlemen for the transaction between them and
the exporter. Then, middlemen are in the market in each regime. I
will show that competition can decrease after liberalization with an
increased market power for the middleman. The impact of transac-
tion costs on the farmer’s price is also assessed with this new model.
However, the effect of the international price is difficult to measure
since it is a constant for each farmer. The following section describes
the empirical model.
3.2.1 Conceptual Framework
Assume there are N farmers , where N ≥ 1. Each farmer i (= 1, ..., N) ,
has unique characteristics,49 yi, enabling him to produce a "differen-
tiated" commodity good qit at time50 t and sold at a nominal price pit.
Indeed, all farmers are producing the same good, which is assumed
49Later on, I will define these characteristics as household characteristics (education, age,...)
and geographic locations (distance to nearest road,...), making the product unique. These
characteristics are equivalent to the transaction costs I discussed in the theoretical model in
the sense that they make every farmer receive a unique price .
50 t will be either the 1992/93 or the 1997/98 period of the surveys.
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to be a differentiated one since each farmer receives a different price
from the buyer due mainly to transaction costs and unique farmer
characteristics. For notational simplicity, the subscript t, will be
omitted in the remainder of this section.
There are K buyers of the commodity, indexed by k = 1, ...,K,
that behave as follows. First, they compete for space or market
share through price. Once market size is set for each buyer, he has
a monopsony power on it. Each buyer k can purchase the commod-
ity good from all farmers in his market. Buyers later resell their
purchase to the world market at an exogenous world price Pw. Each
buyer is located at the center of his market.51 In each market k, we
have Jk farmers and
PK
k=1 Jk = N. In the market of the first buyer,
(k = 1) , we have J1 farmers. Since each farmer receives a different
price, the price vector, of dimension J1x1, received by farmers in
market 1, is P1 = (p11, p12, ..., p1J1)
0 . In the second market, (k = 2) ,
we have J2 farmers and the price vector, of dimension (J2, 1) , re-
ceived by farmers in market 2 is P2 =
¡
p2(J1+1), p2(J1+2), ..., p2(J1+J2)
¢0
.
Similarly, in market k (= 1, 2, ...K), we have Jk farmers and the price
vector, of dimension Jkx1, received by farmers in market k, is Pk =¡
pk(J1+J2+...+Jk−1+1), pk(J1+J2+...+Jk−1+2), ..., pk(J1+J2+...+Jk−1+Jk)
¢0
51Notice that the optimal number of buyers and the optimal location of the buyer are not
primordial for the main results of this chapter. Also, for simplification, the transport cost
from the buyer to the port is assumed to be zero. I already showed at the end of the section









Finally, the price vector received by all the farmers in the country
can be written P = (P 01, P 02, ..., P 0K)0 of dimension
PK
j=1 Jjx1 = Nx1.
Before clarifying the empirical model, I will give a numerical ex-
ample to make the notation easier to handle. Assume that K = 2
buyers, k = 1, 2, and there are N = 5 farmers such that we have
J1 = 2 farmers in market 1 and J2 = 3 farmers in market 2, then N =
J1 + J2 = 5. According to the above notation, the vector of prices in
market 1 is P1 = (p11, p12)0 and the vector of prices in market 2 is P2 =
(p23, p24, p25)0. These price vectors can also be written P1 = (p11, p1J1)0
and P2 = (p2(2+1), p2(2+2), p2(2+3))0 = (p2(J1+1), p2(J1+2), p2(J1+J2))0. The vec-
tor of prices for all farmers is then P = (P 01P 02)0 = (p11, p12, p23, p24, p25)0 =
(p11, p1J1 , p2(J1+1), p2(J1+2), p2(J1+J2))0.These special notations of the farm-
ers’ prices make it easier to develop the derivation of the model in
the following paragraphs.
Define the profit of buyer k by πk(P, Pwk , yk∗) where Pwk = pwI(K,1),
I(K,1) is a Kx1 vector of ones and yk∗ = (yk1, ..., ykJk)
0 where yki ,
i = 1, ...., Jk, is farmer i’s individual characteristics in market k. The
profit function of buyer k depends not only on the prices he of-
fers to farmers in his market, Pk, but also on the prices offered
by the other buyers in the other markets due to spatial compe-
tition. This profit function means that buyers do not hold in-
ventories. This assumption is realistic in the commodity market
52
because of the rapid deterioration of the commodity good and its
huge storage cost. The aggregate profit of all buyers is then52




k , yk∗.) where Pw = pwI(N,1), I(N,1) is a Nx1
vector of ones and y = (y01∗, y02∗, ..., y0K∗)
0
= (y1, y2, ..., yN )
0 is the vector
of characteristics of all farmers.




















































































Following similar works in this literature, I normalize prices by an in-
dex of commodity goods prices V such as epk(Pk−1j=1 Jj+l) = V −1pk(Pk−1j=1 Jj+l),epw = V −1pw and eΠ = V −1Π. In addition, since the international price
is exogenous to buyers, it can be treated as a constant. Eq. (42)
then becomes
52Koopmans (1957) and Mas Collel et al (1995) have shown that the profit obtained if the
buyers jointly maximize profit is the same as when each buyer maximizes his profit separately,
taking price as given.

































































, which is also equivalent to

































































































Now, using the Hotelling lemma, I can derive the optimal quan-



















where li is such that 1 ≤ li ≤ Jk and
Pk−1
j=1 Jj + li = i. Next, the buyer
has to make the farmer produce this quantity by offering a price for
the commodity that maximizes the farmer’s profit. Assume that the
farmer faces various unit cost function Ci and a fixed cost Fi, then
his profit function is:
ϕi = (epki − Ci)qi − Fi (46)
The optimal price, ep∗ki, at which the farmer will sell his production
qi is such that
∂ϕi
∂epki = qi + (epki − Ci) ∂qi∂epki = qi + (epki − Ci)b(1)klikni = 0 (47)
where ni is such that
Pk−1









































The farmer’s price is then


























The optimal farmer’s price, ep∗ki, depends on the price received by
the other farmers in market k as well as in the other markets, the
characteristics of the farmers and the production cost. Equation (48)
will be the basis of my empirical estimation. This equation allows
us to estimate to what extent farmer i’s price is related to other
farmers’ price (spatial competition) and the impact of transaction
costs before and after the reforms. In theory, since the same farmers
have been interviewed in both surveys, any structural change of the
coefficient is related to the reform that has occurred.
However, all the parameters of equation (44) can not be esti-
mated using cross sectional data or short panel data. Therefore, it
is necessary to make some assumptions on the parameters. Based
on the theoretical commodity market model, the constant term can
include the world income growth rate and the international price
of the commodity. To take into consideration these components, a
random effect model is used where −a(2)kli/2b
(1)
klikni
= a + μi, where a is
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a constant term and μi is independently and identically distributed




, on the right hand side of (48)
represent the slope of the reaction curve of price Pki with respect to
the other prices. These coefficients measure the change of price ep∗ki
when the other prices change by one unit. When two farmers are
not in the same market, it seems natural to assume that the reaction
coefficient will depend on the proximity of the markets according to
their geographic location. Following Case (1991, 1992), and Pinske
et al (2002), I assume that this ratio depends on a measure of the





where λ is a parameter to be estimated and dklimn is a measure of
distance between farmers i in market k and farmer n in market m,
which is positive if the two farmers are different, and zero if not.
Eq. (49) still holds if the two farmers are in the same market or
not. By definition of the weighting matrix, dklimn is positive. The
meaning of the weighting matrix for farmers is discussed later on
in this chapter. The sign of λ is important for spatial competition
among buyers. If λ is positive, it will measures the spatial price com-
petition among buyers. The higher the coefficient λ is, the stronger
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spatial competition will be. Market liberalization is supposed to in-
crease price competition. Meanwhile, if λ is negative, then a high
commodity price at the closest farm penalized the farmer.
Commodity market liberalization can also make farmers more
vulnerable, with less role of the government in the market. Thus,
they will loose some marketing power and, middlemen can bene-
fit from it. In this case, price competition will be lower under the
market liberalization. In developing countries, farmers are not ed-
ucated and the level of infrastructure is low. It is then likely that
farmers’ marketing power decreases and spatial competition will be




is the slope of the reaction curve of










if i 6= j (50)
= δ if i = j
where η and δ are parameters to be estimated and d(1)klij is the distance
between farmer i in market k and farmer j , located in any market.
In the model, variables yj, j = 1, ...N, represent the commodity
good’s uniqueness, which is defined by the farmer’s characteristics
and geographic attributes of the farm. Thus, yj reflects the factor
that affects the farmer’s price and can be treated as the character-
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= dklimn. Notice that the matrix Dn = (dklimn)1≤li,n≤N, 1≤k,m≤K =
(dij)1≤i,j≤N is a NxN matrix.
Finally, equation (48) becomes
ep∗ki = a+ δyi + η NX
j=1
j 6=i
















I stack the model in the following form








is a Nx1 vector of prices
the farmers receive, XN = [1, yN ,DNyN , CN ]Nx4 is a matrix of exoge-
nous variables, yN = (y1, y2, ..., yN )0, DN is a NxN weighting matrix
whose (i, j)_th element is dij, β = (a, δ, η, θ)0 . Eq. (52) , the equation
to be estimated, gives the farmer’s price as a function of the farmer
and farm characteristics and the prices received by the other farm-
ers. Estimation procedures take advantage of recent developments
in spatial econometrics and are detailed in the next section.
3.2.2 Estimation procedure
Equation (52) is a first order autoregressive spatial model. Basically,
spatial autocorrelation means that a variable in one market is af-
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fected by the value of that variable in neighboring markets. Two
types of spatial dependence or spatial autocorrelation are known
in the literature: The spatial lag dependence and the spatial error
dependence.
The spatial lag dependence occurs when the dependent variable
in one market is affected by the dependent variable in nearby mar-
kets. This dependence violates the OLS assumption that explana-
tory variables are uncorrelated with the disturbance term. exoge-
nous variables are independent. In this case, OLS coefficients are
biased and inconsistent. Additionally, the model can be written as:
epi = Xiβ + σ NX
j=1,i6=j
dijepj + μi, i = 1, ..., N (53)
where epi and epj are the farmer’s i and j price, σ the spatial autore-
gressive coefficient, dij is the (i, j)-element of the spatial weighting
matrix reflecting the "proximity" of farmers i and j, Xi the matrix
of exogenous explanatory variables, β a vector of coefficients and μi
the spatially autocorrelated disturbance error term. Equation (53)
can be written as (52) .
The second type of spatial dependence, the spatial error depen-
dence, occurs when the error term of the price’s equation in one
market is correlated to the error in the neighbor’s market. In this
case, unobserved variables are correlated over space. This may be
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the case if, for instance, we have the same buyer in two neighbor-
ing markets or buyers in different markets who mimic each other.
Then, the way the buyer will set up his price or the behavior of the
buyer is likely to be correlated in these markets. Furthermore, not
considering spatial error dependence and running an ordinary least
square (OLS) regression will provide inefficient coefficients since the
assumption that the error terms are uncorrelated to each other is
violated. In this case, the covariance matrix is not diagonal and
non-diagonal elements express the structure of the spatial depen-
dence (Anselin, 1999). The error variance matrix has the following
form E(μNμ0N ) = Ω (ϑ) , where ϑ is vector of parameters, and with
the coefficients in a spatial autoregressive (SAR) or spatial moving
average (SMA). If the errors have a SAR error form, the SAR error
model is
PN = XNβ + μN where μN = λDNμN + εN
since μN = (I − λDN )−1εN then PN = XNβ + (I − λDN )−1εN which is
equivalent to
PN = λDNPN +XNβ − λDNXNβ + εN (54)
which is a spatial lag dependence model as in (53) with an additional
term DNXN .
For each type of spatial correlation, a special regression model
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needs to be applied: model (53) or model (54). Before the spatial
regression is performed, one needs to implement a Moran’s I test54
on the OLS residual to check for the presence of spatial correlation.
If spatial correlation is detected, we need to find its type. The
choice between the two spatial autocorrelations, is determined the
significance55 of σ and λ. If both tests are significant, the one with
the higher Lagrange multiplier is selected.
A more general approach can also be adopted using a model with
both specifications. Assume that, in equation (52) , we have spatial
correlation in the disturbance term
μN = ρDNμN + εN (55)
where ρ is the spatially autoregressive parameter and εN is an Nx1
vector of innovations. The Generalized Spatial Two-Stage Least
Squares (GS2SLS) procedure, developed by Kelejian and Prucha
(1998), allows us to estimate this general equation. The advantage
of this estimation technique is that it can be applied to a spatial
model that includes both spatial error and spatial lag correlations.
Also, the assumption of normality of the error term is relaxed.
Recall the model to be estimated is (52) with (55) . Kelejian and
54The Moran’s I statistic is I = (N/S)(e0DNe/e0e) where e is the vector of OLS residual
and S is the sum of all elements in the weighting matrix and N the number of observations.
If the weighting matrix is standardized then I = (e0DNe/e0e)
55 done through a Lagrange multiplier test
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Prucha (1998) proposed a three step-method to estimate this model.56
They rewrite the model
PN = ZNδ + μN (56)
μN = ρDNμN + εN (57)
where ZN = (XN ,DNPN ) and δ = (β0, λ)0. In the first step, the above
model is estimated by a two-stage least squares estimator (TSLS),
where the matrix of instruments, HN , is a subset of linearly inde-
pendent columns of (XN ,DNXN ,D2NXN):
eδN = ³ bZ0N bZN´−1 bZ0NPN (58)
eμN = PN − ZNeδN





H 0N . Spatial autocorrelation of the error term is tested
using the residual term I obtained from the previous estimation and
the Moran-I test. If it is the case, the second step, which consists
of the estimation of the autoregressive parameter ρ, estimates ρ and
56For a detailled discussion on these three steps, see Kelejian and Prucha (1998, 1999).
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and bμN = DNbμN , and bμN = D2NbμN . In the last step, a Cochrane-
Orcutt transformation is applied to (58) and estimated by a TSLS.
The solution is finally
eδN = ³ bZ0N∗(eρ) bZ(eρ)´−1 bZ0N∗(eρ)PN∗(eρ)
where bZ 0N∗(eρ) = THNZ0N∗(eρ), Z0N∗(eρ) = ZN − eρDNZN , PN∗(eρ) = PN −
eρDNPN .
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3.3 Data and Results
3.3.1 Agricultural reforms in Vietnam
The model is estimated using data collected in two national surveys
of Vietnam in 1992/93 and 1997/98. Before I present the data, I
will briefly57 discuss the agricultural reforms in Vietnam that made
the country a good candidate for my estimations. Recent agricul-
tural reforms in Vietnam have been done through two main steps
(Che et al., 2002). The first step, which covers the period 1981-
1987, is characterized by the output-contracting regime.58 Under
this regime, farmers were fully responsible for farming activities on
their allocated land and had to deliver a certain quota of produc-
tion. Farmers were allowed to manage their excess production. This
regime was a semi-success since it gave farmers more control over
their production. However, the success of the output contracting
regime was not sustained, and coupled with bad weather eventually
caused the food crisis in 1987.
The second step, the market liberalization (1988-present) boosts
agricultural production. This step began with Resolution 10 in 1988
that was the first move to give property rights to the farmers. They
were given more autonomy over their production and also over the
57For a detailed presentation of Vietnam economics and agricultural reforms, see appendix
1, and also Che et al (2002), Ninh (2003).
58The government introduced the output-contracting regime with the issuing of Directive
100 CT/TW in January 1981.
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ownership, the purchase, the selling and transfer of their means of
production.59 As a result, farmers had an incentive to work harder,
this was a key contributor to the substantial increase in rice pro-
duction in 1988 and 1989 (Ninh, 2003). However, several problems
remained: the rice market was still controlled by the government,
and land was fragmented into small plots.60 To solve these prob-
lems, the government adopted Resolution 5-HNTW in 1993. This
new law gave farmers the right of long-term land use, the right to
exchange, transfer, lease, inherit and mortgage land. This resolution
also lifted rice market barriers and encouraged more private firms to
enter the sector as well as renovating SOEs. Today, farmers operate
in free markets. Overall, agricultural reforms in Vietnam gave more
autonomy to farmers, and the incentive to work harder. As a re-
sult, Vietnam experienced a huge increase in rice production which
turned the country from a net rice importer at the end of the 1980s
to the second largest rice exporter in the world during the 1990s.
3.3.2 Data
This paper benefits from two unique, extensive and rich data sets
contained in the Vietnam Living Standard Surveys (VNLSS). The
data sets were collected by the Vietnam’s General Statistical Of-
59 such as machines, buffaloes, oxen, and agricultural instruments
60 particularly in the North, and this caused difficulties in mechanisation, irrigation, spe-
cialisation, and product procurement
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fice in the 1992-93 and 1997-98.61 4,800 households were covered in
the 1992-93 survey and 6,000 in 1997-98. The main advantage of
these surveys is the coverage of the same 4,301 households in both
years. While the number of households surveyed each year is rep-
resentative of the population, the households in the panel data are
not necessarily representative at the national level. Nevertheless, it
is the largest household panel data available I am using.
For the estimation, I use a sub-sample of the data consisting of
rice farmers that produce and sell rice, and for whom the per-unit
price of rice is available.62 This yields a sample of 1,400 farmers
survey in 1992/93, 1,520 in 1997/98 and 1,017 farmers if I consider
the same farmers in both years. Vietnam is a good example for my
estimation because data for the same farmers are available and the
country shifted to a domestic free rice market in 1993, just after
the first survey. Before I discuss in detail the empirical results, the
following paragraphs give a description of the sub-population of the
surveys used in my estimations (1,017 rural farmers).
The household size distribution of the population remains almost
the same and the education level of the farmers increases during the
two surveys. Table 2 displays the main characteristics of the sam-
61These surveys were conducted with the financial assistance from the United Nation De-
velopment Program (UNDP) and the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) and
the technical assistance of the World Bank.
62 the per-unit price of rice is calculated as the total revenu from rice over the quantity of
rice sold.
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ple population (1,017 observations) of my analysis in 1992/93 and
1997/98. The first two columns show that the regional distribution
of the population is almost the same in both surveys. Since the
farmer’s main activity is linked to the field, it is difficult to move
to other areas. In terms of household size, the share of the house-
hold of medium size (4 to 6 members) increases from 47 percent
in 1992/93 to 48.3 percent in 1997/98. The level of education of
the farmers increases between the two surveys with more than 90
percent of the population with at least a primary education level in
1997/98 compared to about 70 percent in 1992/93.
The poverty level of the farmers decreases during the five-year
period. The third and fourth columns of Table 2 show that poverty
incidence has declined during the two surveys from 61.5 percent in
1992/93 to 37.6 percent in 1997/98, which means a 39 percent de-
crease of poverty over this five-year period. The analysis of poverty
regarding the other characteristics of the population leads to simi-
lar results for the entire Vietnamese population.63 The robustness of
the poverty reduction can be tested using the stochastic dominance
theory.64 Figure 2 plots the cumulative density functions (CDFs) of
the distribution of per capita expenditure in the two surveys. For
63See Glewwe et al (1999) for a detailed description of the poverty profile of Vietnam for
these two surveys.
64 Stochastic dominance theory ranks welfare measure distributions. The aim is to compare
two welfare distributions, whose cumulative density functions (CDFs) are F1(x) and F2(x),
and to be able to say which one is "better" than the other. The first-order stochastic
dominance definition states F1(x) first-order stochastically dominates F2(x) if and only if for
68
simplification, the per capita expenditure has been re-scaled to one.
This graph allows us to conclude that poverty in the sub sample of
our interest has unambiguously decreased between the two surveys
since per capita expenditure in 1997/98 is "better" or stochastically
dominates the per capita expenditure in 1992/93.
Poverty reduction is also a fact across regions among my sample.
Vietnam is divided in seven regions (see Figure 3). The analysis
across these regions also reveals a decline of poverty in every region.
The largest decline is in the Southeast region, with a reduction of 55
percent in the poverty incidence ratio. The second largest reduction
comes from the Red River Delta, where poverty decreased from 74.6
percent of the population to 38.5 percent over the five years.
Household size and education level of the head of the household
are strongly correlated to welfare. Table 2 also shows the distribu-
tion of poverty according to the household size and education. Small
families have the lowest poverty incidence ratio in both years and
experience the highest poverty reduction between the two surveys.
Households with less than four members experience a poverty reduc-
all monotone non decreasing functions α(x)Z
α(x)dF1(x) ≥
Z
α(x)dF2(x)⇔ F2(x) ≥ F1(x)
where the integral is taken over the whole range of x. The equation above can be interpreted
as the average value of α is at least as large in distribution 1 as in distribution 2, no matter
how we value x. In consequence, distribution 1 is "better," in the sense that it has more of
x, and it stochastically dominates distribution 2. This also means that F2 always has more
mass in the lower part of the distribution, which is why any monotone increasing function
ranks distribution 1 ahead of distribution 2 (Deaton 1997).
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tion from 58.9 percent in 1992/93 to 24.3 percent in 1997/98. Large
households have the smallest reduction of its poverty incidence from
60.6 percent to 50 percent.
The higher the education level of the farmer, the higher the
poverty reduction is between the two surveys. Farmers with no ed-
ucation experience modest reduction in poverty (-25 percent) while
poverty decreased by 56 percent for farmers having at least a tech-
nical education. In the second survey, all farmers with a university
education level moved out of poverty.
The last three columns of Table 2 display the real per capita
expenditure, in US$, in 1992/93 and 1997/98.65 Overall, real ex-
penditure per capita rose by 66.4 percent, which corroborates the
poverty incidence number discussed in the previous paragraphs. The
distribution of the real per capita expenditure according to the seven
regions of Vietnam confirms the highest poverty reduction (-55 per-
cent) of the South East region. This region experienced the highest
increase of per capita expenditure, climbing from US$123 to US$269
65Both surveys took place over a long period of time (about 11 months) and across different
regions. It is then possible that prices, collected for most of the food items, vary over time
and standard of livings are also different across regions. To make the prices and expenditures
comparable within surveys and between surveys, there is a need to calculate a spatial and
monthly deflator indexes. A monthly price deflator has been constructed based on the monthly
consumer index (provided by the General Statistical Office) with January 1993 and January
1998 as the base month. This deflator is then used to remove temporal variation. For spatial
difference, a spatial price deflator has also been calculated. Instead of choosing one specific
region as the base region, the national average has been used as the base group. Therefore,
the spatial price indexes measure the difference between the country region and the national
average of all Vietnam. Using the spatial and temporal deflators make prices and expenditures
comparable in each survey. I then used the annual exchange between the Vietnam Dong and
the US dollar to have these values in US$.
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in 1997/98. The Mekong River Delta had the lowest per capita ex-
penditure gain (38 percent).
Once again, one can say that household size and education level
are correlated to expenditure level. Small size families had the
highest per capita expenditure increase (81 percent). Similarly,
households in which the head had no education were the poorest
(US$169), and experienced the lowest per capita expenditure growth
(41 percent), compared to households where the head had a univer-
sity education level (US$237 and a growth of 119 percent).
The farmer’s price increases less than the world price over the
five-year period. Table 3 displays the farmers real rice’s price (US
cent/kg) and rice area cultivated during the two surveys. Between
the two surveys, the farmer’s price increased on average by 17.7 per-
cent from US cent 16.2 to US cent 19.1. Meanwhile, the world price
of rice increased from US cent 22.1 to US cent 30.5 (38 percent in-
crease). Clearly, the entire world price increase was not transmitted
to farmers. Regarding the regions, Central Highland region expe-
rienced the highest farmer price increase (41 percent), while the
Northern Upland and Mekong River Delta had the lowest farmer
price increase (15 percent). The main regions are worth mentioning
because of the difference in the average farm size. The Red River
Delta had the lowest farm size with only 0.5ha, while the Mekong
River Delta had the highest farmer size (2.2ha). The average size of a
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farm increased overall by 10 percent between the two surveys, which
is modest compared to the total production growth (35 percent).
Table 4 displays the average per capita rice production, auto-
consumption and marketing surplus during the two surveys. Per
capita average rice production increased by 41.1 percent overall.
The Southeast region almost doubled its production per household
(83 percent of increase) and the Mekong River Delta is always the
most productive region in terms of production per household. Over
the five-year period, rice autoconsumption increased by only 6.1
percent and the Northern Upland region experienced the highest in-
crease (51 percent), while the Mekong River Delta reported a decline
of 11 percent. Marketing surplus almost doubled between the two
surveys from 956 kg in 1992/93 to 1, 831kg in 1997/98. This trend is the
same across regions where the lowest growth rate of the marketing
surplus is in the Northern Upland with 40 percent.
Lastly, tables 5 to 7 give some statistics of the farmer’s revenue
from rice, the rice quantity sold and the per-unit rice price. The
per-unit farmer price of rice is obtained by dividing revenues and
quantities. This is what I will call the effective price received by the
farmer. For each of these tables, we have the mean (in thousand of
Vietnam Dong), the coefficient of variation (%), the skewness and
the Kurtosis of the variable. The first observation is that the means
of the rice price almost double between the two surveys. Second, the
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price of rice during the first survey exhibits much higher variability
than the price of rice in the second survey, as measured by the
coefficient of variation. One could have expected higher variability
under the liberalized regime. The variability of the revenue and
quantity are almost the same in the two surveys.
After the characteristics of the sample are summarized, the de-
scription of the variables to be used in the empirical tests are dis-
cussed in the following paragraphs. The effective price received by
the farmer is mainly affected by transaction costs from the buyer’s
location to the farm and by the price competition among buyers. Ba-
sically, transaction costs are the full cost of carrying out exchanges
(Coase, 1960). The complexities of commodity exchanges are the
main sources of transaction costs. The literature classifies the trans-
action costs into Proportional Transaction Costs (PTC) and Fixed
Transaction Costs (FTC).
PTC include the "per-unit cost of accessing markets associated
with the transportation costs (transport cost, packaging or han-
dling)" (Key, Sadoulet et al, 2000). These transaction costs can be
easily estimated in a one dimension space. PTC are generally cap-
tured by transport costs or the distance from the farm to the buyer’s
door or by the level of infrastructure. However, these data are not
available in the survey. Following the literature, I will capture the
effect of PTC by using the farm characteristics and geographic lo-
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cation as a proxy.
To capture the PTC, I added geographic information data to the
survey data. My sample population is located in 90 small commu-
nities across Vietnam. Table 8 gives the number of communes by
region in the country. However, the collection of geographic infor-
mation is not possible at the farm level, but only at the community
level. To address this missing data problem, I attributed the value
of the data of each community to all farmers in that community. By
doing so, I assumed a high degree of homogeneity among farmers
in close geographical proximity. Using the longitude and latitude,
available for each community, I estimated proxies of PTC with a
Geographical Information System (GIS) software. This software
gives several geographic characteristics of the farm.
The variable added to the survey data and used as a proxy of PTC
is the population size in a radius of 10 km (POP10), in thousands.
The population size living in a 10 km radius is a good proxy of PTC
since it may denote a close market and the level of infrastructure.
If more people are living around a farm, it is then likely that there
is a nearby market. The proximity of a market to the farm should
reduce PTC for the farmer, and he should then receive a higher
effective price for his production. In addition, more people living
in an area increase the possibility for a high level of infrastructure,
and thus a reduced PTC.
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Unlike PTC, FTC are invariant to the quantity of the commodity
sold and include search costs, bargaining costs, negotiation costs,
monitoring costs, and enforcement costs. Therefore, FTC are a
multidimensional variables. Following the literature on transaction
costs (Coase, 1960; Sadoulet et al, 1991, 2000; Skoufias, 1995), I
will measure the impact of FTC on the farmer’s price by using the
farmers’ personal characteristics as proxies for FTC.
Farmers’ characteristics are individual and unique attributes. Char-
acteristics such as education, age, and gender of the farmer have a
direct or indirect effect on FTC. Williamson (1979) discusses how
costly transaction costs can be and notes that information asymme-
try may forbid poor farmers to access better technology or better
prices for their production. Education (EDUCATION) is a good
proxy for information costs, in the sense that the more educated
the farmer is, the easier it will be for him to access and understand
a larger variety of information through newspapers, radio, and the
internet. Also, an educated farmer can understand information at
a lower cost. Thus, a high education level should reduce the trans-
action costs. Information costs can also be reduced by information
access. The easier it is for the farmer to access information, the
lower its price will be. Thus, owning a radio or a TV (INFO) should
be a good proxy for information cost. Similarly, the ability to move
easily by owning a car or motorbike can help the farmer increase his
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bargaining power by comparing price. In the empirical estimation,
the variable is labeled MOVE .
Experience in farming and negotiation skills (personal contacts,
better opportunities at a lower cost, reputation,...) can be captured
by the age (in years) of the head of the household (AGE). Older
and more experienced farmers have more personal contacts, which
allows the discovery of trade opportunities at lower costs. Hence,
older farmers are expected to experience lower FTC. The gender
(SEX) of the farmer should also impact the FTC in the sense that
women tend to face higher transaction costs than men. Several
authors (Matunguel et al, 2000) argue that women in the farming
sector face several constraints such as weak property laws, greater
legal uncertainty in court, and lack of equipment. These variables
(education, age and sex), discussed above, are the unique character-
istics of the farmers that allow "product differentiation", as stated
in the empirical model, and are used as proxies for FTC .
In addition to transaction costs, this model tests for spatial price
competition. This effect is captured in the model by the impact
of the "neighbor" or "closest" farmer’s price. Notice this price
is an endogenous variable. I instrumented the nearest neighbor’s
price.66 Following Kelejian and Prucha (1999), I use exogenous ex-
66 Instrumental variables have two main properties: (i) they are uncorrelated with the dis-
turbance term; and (ii) they are correlated with the variable they replace. In my case, I need
to instrument the neighbor price with variables that are independent with the disturbance
term and correlated with the neighbor price.
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planatory variables for the community (Xn) and for the nearest com-
munity (DnXn) as instruments for this variable. I also use the ex-





. I then estimate the model using Kelejian and
Prucha (1998, 1999) as discussed previously (two-stage least squares
(2SLS) procedure and then correction for spatial correlation). In
the regression, the instruments Hn are used to approximate Zn =






in term of the predicted values
bZn = PHnZn and dDnZn = PHnDnZn where PHn = Hn (H 0nHn)−1Hn. In
principle, bZn and dDnZn should approximate, as closely as, possible,







insures that bZn = ³Xn, dDnPn´ and dDnZn =³
DnXn, dD2nPn´ with dDnPn = PHnDnPn and dD2nPn = PHnD2nPn.67 No-
tice also that the elements of Hn are bounded in absolutes values.
68 Furthermore, the estimators remain well defined asymptotically,
which is the case with the choice of the instruments Hn above. This
ensures the validity of the instruments Hn.
The last andmost important data for the estimation is the weight-
ing matrix, DN . The weighting matrix describes the proximity be-
tween any two farmers in our data set and it is a NxN matrix such
that in each row i, a positive number dij specifies j as a neighbor
of i. By definition, dii = 0 , which means that no observation is its
67 assumption 6 in Kelejian and Prucha, 1998 is then satisfy
68 in light of assumption 3 and 4 of Kelejian and Prucha, 1998
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own neighbor.69 Several types of weighting matrixes are used in the
literature based on the geographic distance, economic distance, and
geographic boundary. Neighbors, in my model, are defined at two
levels. A community k is "neighbor" to a community m if m is the
"closest" community to k. Then, all farmers in community k and
m will be neighbors. To define the closest community to k, I can
use the road distance or the Euclidean one. In my case, the road
distance is not available, so using the latitude and longitude of each
community, I calculated the Euclidean distance.70
Also, following Case (1991, 1992), I assume that all farmers in the
same community are "neighbors". This assumption is reasonable
since farmers in a rural area primarily have contact with farmers




such that d∗ij = 1 if i and j are "neighbors", as defined above,
and d∗ij = 0 otherwise. The rows of D∗N are then standardized. The







indicating that the farmer’s neighbors have the same amount of
influence.71
69 See Anselin (2002) for a detailed discussion on the weighting matrix.
70The formula to calculate the Euclidean distance, using the longitute and latitude, =
r ∗ acos[sin(lat1) ∗ sin(lat2) + cos(lat1) ∗ cos(lat2) ∗ cos(lon2 − lon1)] where r = 6378.7
kilometers and (lat1, lon1) and (lat2, lon2) are the latitude and the longitude of location 1
and 2
71The standardized matrix form eases the interpretation and makes parameter estimates
between different models more comparable (Anselin, 2002).
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3.3.3 Empirical Results
Tables 9 and 10 report the estimations for the regulated market
(1992/93) and the liberalized market (1997/98), respectively. The
first two columns of each table present the results from the ordinary
least squares (OLS) and the two-stage least squares (2SLS). Column
three displays the OLS after error auto correlation correction. The
last column shows the result of the Generalized Spatial Two-Stage
Least Squares (GS2SLS). The first three columns of each table are
presented to show how misleading the results could be if we did not
correct for spatial autocorrelation and did apply a simple OLS. For
instance, looking at the coefficient of the price in the neighbor farm
(DnPn), the OLS result underestimates the competition effect. The
OLS coefficients are 0.009548 and 0.004764, respectively, in 1992/93
and 1997/98, while these coefficients are 0.01009 and 0.007727 and
significant for the same years.
These results show several interesting features.72 First, spatial
price competition affects the farmer’s price in both market regimes.
The spatial correlation in prices among communities is statistically
significant and positive in both years. This means that the effec-
tive price received by a farmer is positively correlated to those of
his neighbors. This result confirms the prediction of the empirical
72One needs to be careful with the following results. My sample includes 1,017 farmers that
are not representative of the farmer population in Vietnam. Caution should then be taken
before generalizing these conclusions to the whole country or to all the farmers in Vietnam.
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price competition model. Hence, spatial competition among buyers
benefits farmers in both market regimes. However, the spatial com-
petition effect is smaller after the market liberalization. Indeed, the
coefficient of the nearest community price is 0.01009 under the regu-
lated market regime (1992/93), while it decreases to 0.007727 under
the liberalized regime (1997/98). As noted earlier, these coefficients
measure spatial price competition.
I perform a significance test of the coefficients of the two es-
timations.73 The results show that the competition coefficients are
statistically different during both surveys. The market liberalization
reduces the level of competition. The structure of the market may
explain this result. The farmer is price taker. In addition, under the
liberalized market regime, the farmer is more vulnerable. However,
notice that competition effects are very small. A 1% increase of the
neighbor price is translated by 0.01% increase in price in 1992/1993
and a 0.0007% in 1997/98. When we measure this effect at the
mean price for the average farmer, this implies an increase of price
from 1,700 VD/kg to 1,700.17 VD/kg in 1992/93 and an increase
73For the test, I decompose the IV-regression into 2 regressions. First, I estimate the
endogenous variable using the instruments. Using its predicted value, I did a second regression
for each survey. I then test the equality of the coefficients of the competition effect. I cannot
accept the assumption that the difference coefficients are zero. I did the test for the spatial
competition coefficient and for the PTC coefficient. The results of these tests are the following:
For the spatial competition coefficients: χ2=21.34 and Prob>χ2=0.0000 and for the PTC
coefficients: χ2=7.66 and Prob>χ2=0.0056. These results show that the coefficients are
statistically different each year. These tests assume independence of the two samples, which
is not obvious. If this assumption does not hold, the covariance will be non zero. The results of
the test will be slightly different but the main results of the model, the presence of competition
before and after liberalization, will still hold.
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from 2,700 VD/kg to 2,701.9 VD/kg in 1997/98. Hence, even if the
competition effect is statistically significant, economically, its effect
on the unit price is negligible.
As Kapoor (2003) noticed, caution should be observed when we
interpret the above results. There are cases where prices move to-
gether (positive correlation), but there is no price competition (i.e.
if firms collude to fix a higher price). This dilemma can be solved
if we let the farmer ’s price be inversely related to the income of
the neighboring farmer during each regime.74 The intuition is the
following: During each market regime buyers compete for farmers;
therefore, it is likely that rich farmers with large production and
reduced transaction costs, are more attractive to buyers. And, this
implies that farmers with low income will have to accept a "lower"
price in order to sell their production.
To capture these effects, I added two variables to the regres-
sion: the cultivated rice area75 and the per capita income. The first
variable will capture the production scale effect of the farmer. Large
producers (large area cultivated) are expected to accept lower prices
in order to sell their production faster. The second variable, the per
capita income, enters the regression under two forms. First, it will
74Kapoor (2003) developed a spatial product differentiation model with heterogenous cus-
tomers where he showed that price is inversely related to the neighboring region when
customers are heterogenous. This model can be easily adapted for my commodity market
liberalization model.
75The quantity produced would have been a better variable, but this would have created
an endogeneity since the quantity produced is already used to estimate the rice price.
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capture the farmer’s own welfare effect on the price he received, and
second, it will capture the neighboring farmer’s welfare effect on the
farmer’s price. Two opposite effects are then at play. A rich farmer
has higher bargaining power because he can find other opportuni-
ties elsewhere and has less constraints. In that scenario, income per
capita should have a positive effect on the farmer’s price. On the
other hand, having a large production should allow the farmer to
accept a lower price in order to sell all of his production faster.
As expected, the coefficient of cultivated rice area (-0.000001) is
negative in 1998 and significant. The coefficient for the real per
capita income is positive (0.000018 and 0.000015 respectively) both
years, but significant only under the market liberalization regime
(1997/98). Then, being wealthier increases the farmer’s bargain-
ing power. Regarding the neighboring welfare effect, its coefficient
is negative and significant under the two market regimes. Hence,
farmers are penalized by a wealthier neighbor. Again, like in the
competition effect, the coefficients are very small and their impact
on the price received by the farmer is also small.
Next, I examined the transaction costs effects. I started by ana-
lyzing the PTC. The population size in a 10 km radius of the farm
(POP10) is the proxy used for the PTC. As expected, PTC affects
the farmer’s price under the market liberalization regime (1997/98).
The coefficient of POP10 is positive both years, but statistically sig-
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nificant only under the liberalized market regime. This corroborates
the framework of chapter 2. In the regulated regime, PTC does not
impact farmer’s price as it is supported collectively by all farmers.
A reduction of the PTC by 1%, as measured by an increase of the
population in a 10 km radius, is translated by an increased id the
farmer price by 0.14% in 1997/98.
After the PTC effects, I look at the effect of the FTC, represented
by the farmer’s personal characteristics. Among the proxies used,
few are significant in the estimation. The coefficient of SEX is posi-
tive both years and significant only in 1997/98 (0.030976), showing
that there is still a bias of being a woman in the rural world and
selling rice. Ownership of a TV or radio (INFO), used as an in-
formation access measure, has a positive and significant impact in
1997/98. Also, being a rice buyer in 1993 has a positive and signifi-
cant impact (0.026354) in 1997/98. Indeed, knowing the rice market
is an important factor while selling production, and having been a
buyer previously helps in this direction.
Land ownership, which is used to measure the marketing power
of the farmer (in a sense that a land owner has less pressure to
sell quickly his production), affects farmer’s price in both market
regimes (0.01712 in 1992/93 and 0.000066 in 1997/98) but they are
significant. The other variables of FTC (Education, Age, religion,
household size) have no impact on the farmer’s price according to
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my empirical estimations.
Overall, the main results of my empirical model hold. There
are spatial price competition in both market regimes, as the model
predicted. In addition, contrary to what proponents of market liber-
alization argue, price competition did not increase with rice market
liberalization in the case of Vietnam. It may be the case that, with
less public services, the farmers become more vulnerable to buyers.
Finally, the buyer’s marketing power increases, especially if farm-
ers are not unionized to defend their prices. However, these effects
are difficult to measure. Nevertheless, in the case of Vietnam, the
farmer’s price increases between the two regimes. The question to
answer is whether the farmer’s price increase is due to the world rice
price that increased during the same period, and in this case, the
positive impact of the liberalization will be limited, or if liberaliza-
tion works as liberalization proponents predicted.
3.4 Are The Results Robust?
The previous section discussed my empirical model estimation. The
main results found are: (i) spatial price competition is significant
during both market regimes; (ii) competition is weaker under the lib-
eralized market regime; (iii) proportional transaction costs (PTC)
has a significant effect on effective farmer’s price during the liberal-
ized regime; (iv) fixed transaction costs (FTC) have a limited effect
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on farmer’s price.
One weakness of my estimation is the measure of transaction
costs. Since no PTC or FTC exists in my data, I used proxies for
my estimation. One important question to answer is whether the
main results are due to the choice of these proxies. To overcome
this obstacle, I used several other proxies of PTC and check if my
results still hold.
Using the GIS software, I estimate, besides the population size
in a 10 km radius (POP10), several other geographic variables to
be used as proxies for PTC. The geographic variables added to
the survey data are: (i) the maximum altitude in each community
(ALTMAX) , in meters; (ii) the elevation (ELEVATION) in that
community; (iii) the distance to the closest main city (DCITY), in
kilometers; (iv) the distance to the nearest town (DTOWN), in kilo-
meters; (v) the population in a circle of radius 50 km (POP50); (vi)
the distance to the nearest road (DROAD), in kilometers; (vii) the
distance to the largest river (DLRIVER); (viii) the distance to the
smallest river (SRIVER).
Each of these variables is a good candidate as proxy for PTC.
ALTMAX and ELEVATION give an idea on how flat or not is the
land in the community. A land with high or lot of hills and moun-
tains will be difficult to access and then the PTC will be high. DC-
ITY and DTOWN measure the closeness of the farmer with a city
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and a town. One advantage of being close to a city or a town is the
high level of infrastructure that can reduce PTC. The distance to
the nearest road is an indicator of how difficult it is to transport his
production. Being far away from the road will increase the PTC of
the farmer. Since transportation by river of production is an alter-
native in Vietnam, if the PTC is too high, farmer and buyer can
decide to transport the production by river, when possible. Then
the distance to the largest river (DLRIVER) or to the smallest one
(DSRIVER) may be a way to measure PTC.
For each of these eight proxies of PTC, I rerun the model 1. The
results are displayed in Tables 11 under model from 1_2 to model
1_9. For each of the proxy for PTC, table 11 presents two columns.
Both columns represent the results of the GS2SLS and the first col-
umn represents the regulated market regime (1993) and the second
column represents the liberalized market regime (1998). Each of
these columns represents the fourth column of the benchmark result
of table 9 and 10.
Overall, the benchmark model results hold. For each of these
variables, the coefficient for spatial competition (coefficient of DnPn)
is positive and significant. The change of the PTC proxy does not
alter the existence of spatial price competition. In addition, each of
these models shows a weaker spatial competition coefficient for the
liberalized market regime (1998). The result regarding the impact of
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the farmer own wealth or the neighboring wealth effect also holds.
For each of these specifications, the coefficient of the farmer own
wealth is significant and positive only in 1997/98. The effect of
the neighboring wealth is also negative and significant under both
regimes and for all specifications.
Regarding the PTC effect, except for ALTMAX, POP50, DL-
RIVER and DSRIVER, all the coefficients for PTC have the right
sign. Among the proxies with the right sign, only DCITY, DTOWN
and DROAD are significant only during the liberalized market. The
impact of FTC is once again very limited. Except for the gender,
all the FTC proxies are not significant.
To capture the regional differences, I reran the 18 previous models
with the REGION variables. Once again, the results of the model
hold. I also ran the reduced set of model with key variables for
the FTC. The results of these models are presented in table 12 and
confirm also the main results found previously.
These tests show the robustness of my results in that price compe-
tition in both regimes exists, competition is weaker and transaction
costs are at play under the market liberalization regime.
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4 Conclusion and next steps
This chapter presents an empirical model to discuss the impact of do-
mestic commodity market liberalization on the farmer’s price. This
chapter includes the two features observed in practice: a different
price for each farmer and farmers’ price competition which occurs
in each market regime. The empirical model adds three innova-
tions to the literature: (i) it is one of the few models to analyze the
commodity market liberalization effect at the farmer’s price level;
(ii) it tests the effects of spatial price competition, transaction costs
and the international environment (timing of liberalization) on the
farmer’s price by combining household survey data and geographical
information data; and (iii) it uses recent developments in the field
of spatial econometrics to estimate these effects. Indeed, for the
estimation, I use the Generalized Spatial Two-Stage Least Squares
(GS2SLS) procedure, developed by Kelejian and Prucha (1998). The
advantage of this method is that we don’t need to test the model
for spatial error and spatial lag correlations since the GS2SLS can
be applied to a spatial model that includes both specifications.
The empirical tests are done with two-period household panel
data from Vietnam. The sample studied includes all farmers that
produce and sell rice during these two surveys. The main findings
are the following. First, as predicted by the model, we observe spa-
tial price competition in both market regimes. In addition, we ob-
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serve less competition under the market liberalization regime. Sec-
ond, the estimation shows that proportional transaction costs have
an impact on the farmer’s price. Finally, the last feature, the inter-
national environment around the liberalization, is not tested since
it is difficult to capture in the model. However, the observation of
the constant, which represents all the other variables not included in
the model, move in the same direction as the world price. Since the
constant is positive and almost doubles between these two market
regimes, it may be the case that the international price positively
impacts the farmer’s price during the liberalization period. In addi-
tion, the timing of the liberalization was good, (during an increasing
world price period). It is worth mentioning that the (good or bad)
timing of liberalization is not a consequence of the liberalization,
but is completely exogenous to this process.
This chapter analyzes the effect of commodity market liberal-
ization and found that price competition and transaction costs at
the farmer’s level decrease in a favorable international environment.
These short-term effects of the liberalization process had a posi-
tive impact on the farmer’s price, and ultimately, farmers enjoyed a
poverty incidence reduction of 39 percent during these two periods.
In the case of Vietnam, the liberalization process, which was part
of a set of economic reforms, benefits the farmers in the short-term.
What should be the next steps for the farmer? In the case of
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Vietnam, the combination of lower transaction costs, an increas-
ing world price and a reduction of price competition benefits the
farmer. An important question is whether it is sustainable. Econo-
mists agree that agriculture will be profitable in developing countries
when productivity rises. Economic history of agricultural countries,
which are now developed ones, reveal that agricultural productiv-
ity increases with a reduction of the number of farmers. Thus, if
today’s developing countries plan to benefit from agriculture for
welfare improvement, it may be the case that the government in
these countries should think of a medium-term reconversion of a
large share of the farmers. In the long run, commodity prices are
decreasing and production are increasing.
The trend of the commodity world price in the long run is empir-
ically negative. Figure 5 displays the production volume and world
price of several commodities (cocoa, coffee, tea, rice, sugar, maize,
cotton, and rubber) over a period of 42 years (1960-2002). Except
for sugar, the trend of the price of these commodities is decreasing.
The world price effect that benefits Vietnam farmers may not be
sustainable in the long run.
What should be the next steps for this research? In the future,
I plan to transform the model in an agricultural household model
to analyze the farmer’s welfare following commodity market liber-
alization. The farm household, which constitutes the majority of
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the population in poor countries, offers a good framework to eval-
uate the impact of trade on welfare in poor countries at the micro
level. Agricultural household models are widely used to analyze the
behavior of a farm household. It is well recognized that economic
decisions, at a household farm level, must be treated as a special case
because of its dual role as consumer and producer.76 In a seminal
book, Singh, Squire, and Strauss (1986) presented a comprehensive
theory as well as various empirical models of the behavior of the
agricultural household.
Obviously, the future of farmers in developing countries depends
on the reduction of the number of farmers. The farmers who will
leave the farming sector should find jobs in other sectors. This new
model should take into account the movement of farmer household
members from agriculture job to non agricultural job outside the
household. I will also give more power to the farmer for their pro-
duction sale, which means that farmers will also bear the world price
variability, in addition to the production one. Short and long-term
effects will be evaluated in the presence of price and production
variability. This framework should assist in my analysis of the
76As a producer, the household chooses the allocation of land, labor and other inputs
for production, and as a consumer, it chooses the allocation of income (from agricultural
production profit and off-farm labor wage) to goods and services’ consumption. The key point
in this framework is the non-reparability of the household’ s decision in terms of production
and consumption choices. Income is endogenous, as opposed to the pure consumer theory, and
production function inputs choice may be interrelated to the choice made for consumption, as
opposed to the firm theory.
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Source: Minot and Goletti (2000) and author. 
Note: Figures in parenthesis are the number of communities in each region surveyed and where 





















































































  Population share (%)    Headcount index (%)    
Real  per capita consumption 
expenditure  (US$) 
  1992‐93  1997‐98    1992‐93 1997‐98 Change   1992‐93  1997‐98  Change 
                     
Rural  100  100    61.55  37.56  ‐39.0    109  182  66.4 
                     
Region                     
   Northern Uplands  12.2  12.7    82.3  56.6  ‐31    87  140  61 
   North Central  14.2  14.2    84.0  56.9  ‐32    82  153  86 
   Red River Delta  32.9  32.5    74.6  38.5  ‐48    100  184  84 
   Central Coast  7.6  7.6    46.8  27.3  ‐42    120  183  52 
   Central Highlands  0.6  0.6    100.0  100.0  0    36  46  26 
   South East  6.9  6.9    31.4  14.3  ‐55    123  269  117 
   Mekong River Delta  25.7  25.7    34.1  24.1  ‐29    141  195  38 
                     
Ethnic Group                     
   Vietnamese (Kinh)  90.8  90.8    60.7  35.9  ‐41    110  186  68 
   Chinese  0.4  0.5    0.0  0.0  0    141  222  0 
   Other  8.9  8.8    73.3  57.3  ‐22    96  136  41 
                     
Household size                     
    small (<=3)  20.6  20.3    58.9  24.3  ‐59    119  215  81 
   Medium (3‐6 members)  44.7  48.3    63.5  35.0  ‐45    109  183  67 




                     
Education of the head                     
   None  27.9  8.1    52.1  39.0  ‐25    119  169  41 
   Primary  25.9  39.0    60.1  34.8  ‐42    111  182  64 
   Lower secondary  27.8  40.8    72.4  41.7  ‐42    100  181  81 
   Upper secondary  3.6  8.6    67.6  35.6  ‐47    107  187  75 
   Technical  4.2  2.9    62.8  27.6  ‐56    96  193  101 
   University  10.5  0.7    58.9  0.0  ‐100    108  237  119 
Source: Author based on Vietnam 1992/93 and 1997/98 Household surveys. 
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Table 3: Vietnam, Real Rice farmer’s price and Area cultivated, 1992/93 and 1997/98 
  Real Farmerʹs rice price (US cent/kg)    Rice area (ha) 
1992/93  1997/98  Change (%)    1992/93  1997/98  Change (%) 
               
All Observations  16.2  19.1  17.7    10,7  11.8  10.2 
               
Region               
   Northern Uplands  16.7  19.3  15    0.6  0.6  17 
   North Central  14.6  18.8  29    0.6  0.6  ‐1 
   Red River Delta  19.7  22.0  12    0.5  0.5  ‐4 
   Central Coast  14.0  18.5  32    0.8  0.8  ‐5 
   Central Highlands  12.7  18.0  41    0.8  1.0  31 
   South East  13.7  17.8  30    1.3  2.2  66 
   Mekong River Delta  13.8  15.8  15    2.2  2.4  8 
               
World Rice Price (UScent/kg)  22.1  30.5  38.0         
FOB price (UScent/kg)  19.8  27.4  38.4         






  Rice Production/household (kg)  Home consumption  (kg)  Marketing Surplus (kg) 
  1992  1997  Change (%)  1992  1997  Change (%)  1992  1997  Change (%) 
                   
All Observations  2331  3290  41.1  1375  1459  6.1  956  1831  91.5 
                   
Region                   
   Northern Uplands  1157  1716  48  862  1302  51  295  414  40 
   North Central  1343  1763  31  1024  1164  14  319  600  88 
   Red River Delta  1245  1658  33  949  1102  16  296  556  88 
   Central Coast  1659  1960  18  1278  1295  1  381  665  75 
   Central Highlands  942  1579  68  882  1306  48  60  273  355 
   South East  2559  4678  83  1207  1536  27  1352  3141  132 
   Mekong River Delta  4998  7033  41  2445  2180  ‐11  2553  4852  90 
                   




    1993    1998  Mean change (%)
Region  Obs.  Mean  CV (%)  S  K    Mean  CV (%)  S  K   
                         
Northern Uplands  129    520.4  91.2  1.7  6.7    1054.3  153.3  7.4  71.3  102.6 
North Central  330    562.3  82.2  2.3  14.2    1613.3  86.5  2.3  11.1  186.9 
Red River Delta  144    500.1  87.4  2.5  11.8    1458.7  83.0  1.3  4.3  191.7 
Central Coast  77    564.8  98.2  1.7  6.2    1880.5  83.5  1.3  4.2  232.9 
Central Highlands  6    90.8  62.9  1.3  3.4    800.8  82.6  0.8  2.2  781.9 
South East  70    2172.1  149.3  2.9  11.7    7886.5  147.0  3.8  21.9  263.1 
Mekong River Delta  261    3827.1  120.6  3.6  21.3    10866.4  114.0  2.2  8.8  183.9 
Total  1017    1496.4  193.2  5.8  51.6    4342.4  188.5  4.4  27.7  190.2 
Source: Author, based on Vietnam 1992/93 and 1997/98 Household surveys. 
Notes: Obs.= Observation;  CV= Coefficient of  Variation; S= Skewness; K= Kurtosis; LCU: Local Currency Unit =Vietnam Dong.  
Kurtosis and skewness give additional information on the “shape” of a probability distribution. Kurtosis with a value lower than 3, indicates distribution with fat or short tails; greater than 3 
indicates distribution with slim or long tails; the distribution is normally distributed is kurtosis equals 3. For a normally distributed variables skewness equals 0; if it is less than 0, the 





      1993    1998  Mean change (%)
Region  Obs  Mean  CV (%)  S  K    Mean  CV (%)  S  K   
                         
Northern Uplands  129   295.2  89.2  1.6  6.2    413.9  186.4  8.8  90.6  40.2 
North Central  330   296.2  72.2  1.1  4.3    555.7  83.2  2.2  11.1  87.6 
Red River Delta  144   319.2  88.0  2.6  12.9    599.6  87.9  1.5  4.8  87.8 
Central Coast  77   381.0  99.0  1.7  5.9    665.5  81.1  1.4  4.5  74.7 
Central Highlands  6   59.9  62.9  1.3  3.4    273.0  83.2  0.9  2.4  355.8 
South East  70   1351.9  159.3  3.2  13.5    3141.0  145.7  3.9  22.7  132.3 
Mekong River Delta  261   2553.3  115.7  3.7  23.1    4852.4  115.3  2.5  11.3  90.0 
Total  1017   956.3  197.0  5.7  52.8    1831.2  198.5  4.6  31.2  91.5 
Source: Author, based on Vietnam 1992/93 and 1997/98 Household surveys. 
Notes: Obs.= Observation;  CV= Coefficient of  Variation; S= Skewness; K= Kurtosis; LCU: Local Currency Unit =Vietnam Dong.  
Kurtosis and skewness give additional information on the “shape” of a probability distribution. Kurtosis with a value lower than 3, indicates distribution with fat or short tails; greater than 3 
indicates distribution with slim or long tails; the distribution is normally distributed is kurtosis equals 3. For a normally distributed variables skewness equals 0; if it is less than 0, the 







      1993    1998  Mean change (%)
Region  Obs  Mean  CV (%)  S  K    Mean  CV (%)  S  K   
                         
Northern Uplands  129    1.8  16.6  3.7  21.3    2.7  21.7  0.9  4.5  47.9 
North Central  330    2.0  31.1  4.0  26.8    2.9  22.2  0.7  3.2  50.5 
Red River Delta  144    1.6  41.3  0.4  11.6    2.6  22.2  0.8  4.2  61.7 
Central Coast  77    1.4  10.9  0.7  7.2    2.8  12.8  ‐0.6  3.0  90.1 
Central Highlands  6    1.5  0.0  1.8  4.2    2.9  13.5  0.6  1.7  92.5 
South East  70    1.7  18.5  4.6  31.2    2.5  12.6  0.3  2.5  51.4 
Mekong River Delta  261    1.5  64.1  9.4  105.0    2.3  16.0  0.5  3.1  48.7 
Total  1017    1.7  38.2  9.1  137.4    2.7  22.0  1.0  4.3  53.6 
Source: Author, based on Vietnam 1992/93 and 1997/98 Household surveys. 
Notes: Rice unit price is obtained by dividing the farmer revenue from rice by the quantity of rice sold. 
Obs.= Observation;  CV= Coefficient of  Variation; S= Skewness; K= Kurtosis; LCU: Local Currency Unit =Vietnam Dong.  
Kurtosis and skewness give additional information on the “shape” of a probability distribution. Kurtosis with a value lower than 3, indicates distribution with fat or short tails; greater than 3 
indicates distribution with slim or long tails; the distribution is normally distributed is kurtosis equals 3. For normally distributed variables skewness equals 0; if it is less than 0, the 

















Source: Author, based on Vietnam 1992/93 and 1997/98 Household surveys. 






Model 1: 1993  OLS  TSLS  Corrected OLS  GS2SLS 
Constant  0.379501  0.376567  0.405466  0.400757 
  [0.072047]***  [0.072073]***  [0.074016]***  [0.074059]*** 
DnPrice  0.009548  0.010415  0.008721  0.01009 
  [0.001033]***  [0.001034]***  [0.001285]***  [0.001287]*** 
Real PC expenditure 1993  0.000025  0.000027  0.000016  0.000018 
  [0.000014]*  [0.000014]*  [0.000014]  [0.000014] 
Dn(Real PC expenditure)  ‐0.000004  ‐0.000004  ‐0.000003  ‐0.000004 
  [0.000000]***  [0.000000]***  [0.000001]***  [0.000001]*** 
PTC(+)  0.091007  0.081162  0.061915  0.049474 
  [0.059048]  [0.059071]  [0.063022]  [0.063061] 
Rice area cultivated (M2)  ‐0.000001  0  ‐0.000001  0 
  [0.000001]  [0.000001]  [0.000001]  [0.000001] 
FTC(++)         
AGE  ‐0.000095  ‐0.000138  ‐0.00005  ‐0.000089 
  [0.000603]  [0.000604]  [0.000603]  [0.000603] 
Household size  0.00426  0.00491  0.002896  0.003589 
  [0.004369]  [0.004371]  [0.004360]  [0.004362] 
Religion         
Other         
Buddist  0.020382  0.021015  0.015632  0.01647 
  [0.016055]  [0.016061]  [0.016857]  [0.016866] 
SEX         
Female         
Male  0.006465  0.007704  0.000727  0.00203 




Education         
No education         
Primary  ‐0.015817  ‐0.017687  ‐0.014277  ‐0.016235 
  [0.019371]  [0.019378]  [0.019289]  [0.019301] 
Lower Secondary  ‐0.007377  ‐0.010122  ‐0.005979  ‐0.008798 
  [0.021979]  [0.021988]  [0.021917]  [0.021930] 
Higher Secondary  0.016394  0.013332  0.022191  0.01912 
  [0.040771]  [0.040786]  [0.040727]  [0.040751] 
Technical  ‐0.025446  ‐0.026625  ‐0.025344  ‐0.02646 
  [0.022513]  [0.022522]  [0.022458]  [0.022471] 
Education of the Spouse         
No education         
Primary  0.019686  0.019397  0.01941  0.019229 
  [0.019624]  [0.019631]  [0.019531]  [0.019542] 
Lower Secondary  ‐0.000694  ‐0.002539  0.004614  0.002532 
  [0.020084]  [0.020091]  [0.020097]  [0.020109] 
Higher Secondary  ‐0.028035  ‐0.029495  ‐0.020724  ‐0.02256 
  [0.038083]  [0.038096]  [0.038047]  [0.038069] 
Technical  ‐0.000816  ‐0.000874  0.001249  0.001283 
  [0.021557]  [0.021564]  [0.021468]  [0.021481] 
Source: Author, based on Vietnam 1992/93 and 1997/98 Household surveys. 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets,   (*) Significant at 10%; (**) significant at 5%; (***) significant at 1% 
(+) PTC=Proportional Transaction Costs is the size of the population in a 10 km radius 






Model 1: 1993  OLS  TSLS  Corrected OLS  GS2SLS 
Owner  0.018636  0.013127  0.023175  0.01712 
  [0.018405]  [0.018413]  [0.018766]  [0.018779] 
Rice buyer  0.025664  0.026389  0.027441  0.028571 
  [0.048137]  [0.048154]  [0.047856]  [0.047884] 
INFORMATION  ‐0.005075  ‐0.004961  ‐0.006417  ‐0.006448 
  [0.015113]  [0.015119]  [0.015155]  [0.015164] 
MOVE  0.005201  0.003823  0.004905  0.003495 
  [0.016315]  [0.016321]  [0.016462]  [0.016472] 
MONTH OF SURVEY         
Nov‐92         
Dec‐92  ‐0.01129  ‐0.010191  ‐0.016533  ‐0.015146 
  [0.038356]  [0.038370]  [0.039947]  [0.039970] 
Jan‐93  0.018399  0.021145  0.008728  0.01192 
  [0.039719]  [0.039734]  [0.040958]  [0.040982] 
Feb‐93  0.086398  0.08559  0.072819  0.072396 
  [0.043454]**  [0.043470]**  [0.044842]  [0.044868] 
Mar‐93  0.055833  0.057748  0.035658  0.037546 
  [0.043623]  [0.043639]  [0.045714]  [0.045740] 
Apr‐93  0.0412  0.042927  0.032272  0.032679 
  [0.040916]  [0.040931]  [0.043499]  [0.043525] 
May‐93  ‐0.042227  ‐0.040109  ‐0.049214  ‐0.047889 
  [0.039009]  [0.039023]  [0.041530]  [0.041554] 
Jun‐93  0.010256  0.010722  0.01078  0.010393 
  [0.039246]  [0.039260]  [0.041460]  [0.041484] 
Jul‐93  ‐0.093293  ‐0.091203  ‐0.096168  ‐0.09518 
 110
  [0.053664]*  [0.053684]*  [0.055576]*  [0.055608]* 
Aug‐93  0.02515  0.029634  0.020741  0.025743 
  [0.039683]  [0.039698]  [0.041379]  [0.041404] 
Sep‐93  ‐0.059435  ‐0.057895  ‐0.061673  ‐0.060149 
  [0.038416]  [0.038430]  [0.040221]  [0.040245] 
         
Observations  1017  1017  1017  1017 
ρ  0.06008       
Moran I  15.408       
R‐squared  0.78    0.86   
Source: Author, based on Vietnam 1992/93 and 1997/98 Household surveys. 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets,   (*) Significant at 10%; (**) significant at 5%; (***) significant at 1% 
(+) PTC=Proportional Transaction Costs is the size of the population in a 10 km radius 






Model 1: 1998  OLS  TSLS  Corrected OLS  GS2SLS 
Constant  0.684065  0.681228  0.788031  0.788462 
  [0.090222]***  [0.090233]***  [0.088928]***  [0.088974]*** 
DnPrice  0.004764  0.00515  0.00638  0.007727 
  [0.000826]***  [0.000826]***  [0.001337]***  [0.001340]*** 
Real PC expenditure 1993  0.000027  0.000028  0.000015  0.000015 
  [0.000006]***  [0.000006]***  [0.000005]***  [0.000005]*** 
Dn(Real PC expenditure)  ‐0.000002  ‐0.000002  ‐0.000003  ‐0.000004 
  [0.000000]***  [0.000000]***  [0.000001]***  [0.000001]*** 
PTC(+)  0.234539  0.230807  0.144838  0.136723 
  [0.047761]***  [0.047767]***  [0.053952]***  [0.053981]** 
Rice area cultivated (M2)  ‐0.000001  ‐0.000001  ‐0.000001  ‐0.000001 
  [0.000000]***  [0.000000]***  [0.000000]**  [0.000000]* 
FTC(++)          
AGE  ‐0.000316  ‐0.000337  ‐0.000079  ‐0.000113 
  [0.000506]  [0.000506]  [0.000487]  [0.000487] 
Religion          
Other          
Buddist  ‐0.017225  ‐0.016006  ‐0.004714  ‐0.002317 
  [0.015138]  [0.015140]  [0.015733]  [0.015741] 
SEX          
Female          
Male  0.046642  0.047158  0.037848  0.039076 
  [0.023019]**  [0.023022]**  [0.022005]*  [0.022017]* 
Education          
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No education          
Primary  ‐0.046165  ‐0.046788  ‐0.038319  ‐0.039002 
  [0.022371]**  [0.022374]**  [0.021729]*  [0.021740]* 
Lower Secondary  ‐0.050751  ‐0.052594  ‐0.043423  ‐0.046303 
  [0.025315]**  [0.025319]**  [0.024645]*  [0.024658]* 
Higher Secondary  ‐0.029889  ‐0.031876  ‐0.006824  ‐0.009404 
  [0.030611]  [0.030615]  [0.029832]  [0.029847] 
Technical  ‐0.077109  ‐0.07969  ‐0.055965  ‐0.05886 
  [0.038181]**  [0.038185]**  [0.036907]  [0.036926] 
Education of the Spouse         
No education         
Primary  ‐0.013103  ‐0.012701  ‐0.024562  ‐0.023608 
  [0.017880]  [0.017882]  [0.017104]  [0.017113] 
Lower Secondary  0.007132  0.006789  0.003549  0.003239 
  [0.019309]  [0.019312]  [0.018570]  [0.018580] 
Higher Secondary  ‐0.0071  ‐0.007132  ‐0.005793  ‐0.004912 
  [0.025991]  [0.025994]  [0.025037]  [0.025050] 
Technical  0.052362  0.05248  0.048421  0.048228 
  [0.042190]  [0.042195]  [0.040397]  [0.040418] 
Source: Author, based on Vietnam 1992/93 and 1997/98 Household surveys. 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets,   (*) Significant at 10%; (**) significant at 5%; (***) significant at 1% 
(+) PTC=Proportional Transaction Costs is the size of the population in a 10 km radius 






Model 1: 1998  OLS  TSLS  Corrected OLS  GS2SLS 
Owner  ‐0.008597  ‐0.008163  ‐0.000573  0.000066 
  [0.016478]  [0.016479]  [0.016763]  [0.016771] 
Rice buyer  0.130012  0.13121  0.13238  0.135782 
  [0.076769]*  [0.076778]*  [0.073609]*  [0.073647]* 
INFORMATION  0.014255  0.015006  0.024835  0.026354 
  [0.012571]  [0.012573]  [0.012121]**  [0.012128]** 
MOVE  0.033446  0.033273  0.022251  0.020877 
  [0.015743]**  [0.015745]**  [0.015526]  [0.015534] 
MONTH OF SURVEY         
Nov‐92         
Dec‐92  ‐0.046335  ‐0.045839  ‐0.047969  ‐0.048112 
  [0.027161]*  [0.027164]*  [0.027455]*  [0.027469]* 
Jan‐93  ‐0.006919  ‐0.006396  ‐0.026582  ‐0.027271 
  [0.022984]  [0.022986]  [0.023115]  [0.023127] 
Feb‐93  0.054652  0.055583  0.048973  0.049036 
  [0.025013]**  [0.025016]**  [0.026753]*  [0.026766]* 
Mar‐93  0.056559  0.057478  0.046563  0.04675 
  [0.029703]*  [0.029707]*  [0.033736]  [0.033753] 
Apr‐93  0.090506  0.091002  0.022385  0.020296 
  [0.025564]***  [0.025567]***  [0.029371]  [0.029386] 
May‐93  0.120354  0.120947  0.086562  0.08588 
  [0.024263]***  [0.024266]***  [0.026561]***  [0.026575]*** 
Jun‐93  0.198322  0.198469  0.153164  0.152306 
  [0.025622]***  [0.025625]***  [0.029829]***  [0.029844]*** 
Jul‐93  0.208712  0.208609  0.158812  0.157683 
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  [0.023911]***  [0.023914]***  [0.027972]***  [0.027987]*** 
Aug‐93  0.154536  0.153824  0.151512  0.150343 
  [0.026664]***  [0.026667]***  [0.030521]***  [0.030537]*** 
Sep‐93  ‐0.012177  ‐0.012463  ‐0.032071  ‐0.03372 
  [0.026085]  [0.026088]  [0.024701]  [0.024713] 
          
Observations  1017  1017  1017  1017 
ρ  0.029852       
Moran I  14.535       
R‐squared  0.94     0.97    
Source: Author, based on Vietnam 1992/93 and 1997/98 Household surveys. 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets,   (*) Significant at 10%; (**) significant at 5%; (***) significant at 1% 
(+) PTC=Proportional Transaction Costs is the size of the population in a 10 km radius 









Log of unit rice price  Model 1_2: Altmax    Model 1_3: Elevation    Model 1_4: DMCITY 
  1993  1998    1993  1998    1993  1998 
Constant  0.400459  0.79423    0.403378  0.79971    0.415025  0.785012 
  [0.074554]***  [0.089104]***    [0.074332]***  [0.089253]***    [0.074769]***  [0.089673]*** 
DnPrice  0.010252  0.007938    0.010289  0.008273    0.009971  0.008363 
  [0.001316]***  [0.001475]***    [0.001246]***  [0.001485]***    [0.001338]***  [0.001422]*** 
Real PC expenditure 1993  0.000017  0.000015    0.000018  0.000015    0.000016  0.000016 
  [0.000014]  [0.000006]***    [0.000014]  [0.000006]***    [0.000014]  [0.000006]*** 
Dn(Real PC expenditure)  ‐0.000004  ‐0.000004    ‐0.000004  ‐0.000004    ‐0.000004  ‐0.000004 
  [0.000001]***  [0.000001]***    [0.000001]***  [0.000001]***    [0.000001]***  [0.000001]*** 
PTC(+)  0.000027  0.000009    ‐0.000016  ‐0.000019    ‐0.000996  ‐0.000692 
  [0.000046]  [0.000040]    [0.000036]  [0.000028]    [0.000759]  [0.000665]** 
Rice area cultivated (M2)  0  ‐0.000001    0  ‐0.000001    0  ‐0.000001 
  [0.000001]  [0.000000]*    [0.000001]  [0.000000]*    [0.000001]  [0.000000]** 
FTC(++)                 
AGE  ‐0.000062  ‐0.000123    ‐0.000074  ‐0.000152    ‐0.000051  ‐0.00014 
  [0.000603]  [0.000489]    [0.000603]  [0.000491]    [0.000602]  [0.000489] 
Religion                 
Other                 
Buddist  0.016554  ‐0.005018    0.016218  ‐0.005303    0.017424  ‐0.006088 
  [0.017002]  [0.015803]    [0.016857]  [0.015817]    [0.017024]  [0.015856] 
SEX                 
Female                 
Male  0.002143  0.040923    0.002559  0.041011    0.001159  0.041974 
  [0.025941]  [0.022057]*    [0.025978]  [0.022059]*    [0.025918]  [0.022078]* 
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Education                 
No education                 
Primary  ‐0.015176  ‐0.037365    ‐0.015606  ‐0.0378    ‐0.016536  ‐0.038912 
  [0.019298]  [0.021791]*    [0.019305]  [0.021793]*    [0.019282]  [0.021816]* 
Lower Secondary  ‐0.006829  ‐0.043767    ‐0.007357  ‐0.044094    ‐0.00831  ‐0.045676 
  [0.021845]  [0.024699]*    [0.021851]  [0.024704]*    [0.021836]  [0.024747]* 
Higher Secondary  0.021964  ‐0.005539    0.019359  ‐0.006233    0.019602  ‐0.007442 
  [0.040764]  [0.029904]    [0.040767]  [0.029907]    [0.040709]  [0.029926] 
Technical  ‐0.026328  ‐0.060101    ‐0.027029  ‐0.061322    ‐0.026923  ‐0.060389 
  [0.022473]  [0.037020]    [0.022495]  [0.037036]*    [0.022449]  [0.037014] 
Owner  0.017743  ‐0.002108    0.016839  ‐0.001494    0.019676  ‐0.001538 
  [0.018823]  [0.016836]    [0.018767]  [0.016799]    [0.018869]  [0.016799] 
Rice buyer  0.029372  0.137937    0.028407  0.138317    0.030305  0.140794 
  [0.047859]  [0.073837]*    [0.047937]  [0.073842]*    [0.047809]  [0.073858]* 
INFORMATION  ‐0.007055  0.024135    ‐0.006818  0.024447    ‐0.006518  0.024834 
  [0.015163]  [0.012165]**    [0.015160]  [0.012165]**    [0.015155]  [0.012160]** 
MOVE  0.002792  0.019658    0.003147  0.019821    0.003464  0.019457 
  [0.016473]  [0.015566]    [0.016460]  [0.015557]    [0.016469]  [0.015560] 
Source: Author, based on Vietnam 1992/93 and 1997/98 Household surveys. 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets,   (*) Significant at 10%; (**) significant at 5%; (***) significant at 1% 
(+) PTC=Proportional Transaction Costs is the size of the population in a 10 km radius 





  Model 1_5: DNTOWN    Model 1_6: POP50    Model 1_7: ROAD 
  1993  1998    1993  1998    1993  1998 
Constant  0.398452  0.83161    0.414136  0.779814   0.416133 0.819425
  [0.074709]***  [0.089397]***    [0.074676]***  [0.089226]***    [0.074733]***  [0.088884]*** 
DnPrice  0.01026  0.008867    0.010553  0.008245   0.010046 0.007458
  [0.001276]***  [0.001365]***    [0.001359]***  [0.001391]***    [0.001317]***  [0.001434]*** 
Real PC expenditure   0.000018  0.000015    0.000017  0.000015   0.000018 0.000016
  [0.000015]  [0.000005]***    [0.000014]  [0.000005]***    [0.000015]  [0.000005]*** 
Dn(Real PC expenditure)  ‐0.000004  ‐0.000004    ‐0.000004  ‐0.000004   ‐0.000004 ‐0.000004
  [0.000001]***  [0.000001]***    [0.000001]***  [0.000001]***    [0.000001]***  [0.000001]*** 
PTC(+)  ‐0.0202  ‐0.012718    ‐0.002938  0.003421   ‐0.003108 ‐0.003707
  [0.005502]  [0.003860]***    [0.002020]  [0.001575]**    [0.001442]  [0.001165]*** 
Rice area cultivated (M2)  0  ‐0.000001    0  ‐0.000001   0 ‐0.000001
  [0.000001]  [0.000000]    [0.000001]  [0.000000]**    [0.000001]  [0.000000] 
FTC(++)                 
AGE  ‐0.000066  ‐0.000238    ‐0.000179  ‐0.00009   ‐0.00019 ‐0.000289
  [0.000603]  [0.000488]    [0.000608]  [0.000488]    [0.000608]  [0.000489] 
Religion                 
Other                 
Buddist  0.015728  ‐0.007166    0.016632  ‐0.005589   0.017668 ‐0.003333
  [0.016963]  [0.015734]    [0.017008]  [0.015765]    [0.016990]  [0.015717] 
SEX                 
Female                 
Male  0.002838  0.040457    0.003405  0.042841   0.002249 0.036631
  [0.025963]  [0.021968]*    [0.025945]  [0.022034]*    [0.025913]  [0.021983]* 
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Education                 
No education                 
Primary  ‐0.015857  ‐0.042464    ‐0.016995  ‐0.04221   ‐0.017042 ‐0.03608
  [0.019301]  [0.021741]*    [0.019297]  [0.021840]*    [0.019292]  [0.021680]* 
Lower Secondary  ‐0.007412  ‐0.049246    ‐0.009014  ‐0.049676   ‐0.008251 ‐0.041765
  [0.021854]  [0.024649]**    [0.021861]  [0.024786]**    [0.021828]  [0.024582]* 
Higher Secondary  0.020447  ‐0.01037    0.017815  ‐0.010595   0.0185 ‐0.003625
  [0.040741]  [0.029802]    [0.040771]  [0.029912]    [0.040722]  [0.029753] 
Technical  ‐0.02673  ‐0.062291    ‐0.028673  ‐0.061336   ‐0.028581 ‐0.057872
  [0.022479]  [0.036864]*    [0.022500]  [0.036948]*    [0.022488]  [0.036822] 
Owner  0.017045  0.001698    0.019631  0.001143   0.018375 0.001455
  [0.018800]  [0.016759]    [0.018868]  [0.016814]    [0.018810]  [0.016736] 
Rice buyer  0.029356  0.131505    0.031866  0.136894   0.030991 0.139426
  [0.047887]  [0.073556]*    [0.047840]  [0.073700]*    [0.047818]  [0.073441]* 
INFORMATION  ‐0.00667  0.025394    ‐0.006496  0.025398   ‐0.006946 0.02434
  [0.015173]  [0.012105]**    [0.015160]  [0.012139]**    [0.015147]  [0.012096]** 
MOVE  0.002753  0.017249    0.002523  0.019213   0.001891 0.020659
  [0.016465]  [0.015512]    [0.016471]  [0.015532]    [0.016468]  [0.015477] 
Source: Author, based on Vietnam 1992/93 and 1997/98 Household surveys. 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets,   (*) Significant at 10%; (**) significant at 5%; (***) significant at 1% 







  Model 1_8: DLRIVER    Model 1_9: DSRIVER 
  1993  1998    1993  1998 
Constant  0.4038  0.791428    0.414032  0.796628 
  [0.074353]***  [0.089551]***    [0.074673]***  [0.088906]*** 
DnPrice  0.010176  0.008088    0.010265  0.007956 
  [0.001305]***  [0.001446]***    [0.001323]***  [0.001458]*** 
Real PC expenditure 1993  0.000017  0.000015    0.000018  0.000015 
  [0.000014]  [0.000006]***    [0.000014]  [0.000006]*** 
Dn(Real PC expenditure)  ‐0.000004  ‐0.000004    ‐0.000004  ‐0.000004 
  [0.000001]***  [0.000001]***    [0.000001]***  [0.000001]*** 
PTC(+)  ‐0.0002  0.000288    ‐0.000304  0.000272 
  [0.000730]  [0.000689]    [0.000223]  [0.000171] 
Rice area cultivated (M2)  0  ‐0.000001    0  ‐0.000001 
  [0.000001]  [0.000000]*    [0.000001]  [0.000000]* 
FTC(++)           
AGE  ‐0.000072  ‐0.000098    ‐0.000066  ‐0.000127 
  [0.000604]  [0.000493]    [0.000602]  [0.000489] 
Religion           
Other           
Buddist  0.016492  ‐0.005151    0.015787  ‐0.005282 
  [0.016969]  [0.015823]    [0.016968]  [0.015784] 
SEX           
Female           
Male  0.002073  0.041099    0.004827  0.038455 
  [0.025968]  [0.022061]*    [0.026008]  [0.022087]* 
Education           
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No education           
Primary  ‐0.015836  ‐0.03726    ‐0.014729  ‐0.037921 
  [0.019306]  [0.021807]*    [0.019280]  [0.021763]* 
Lower Secondary  ‐0.007515  ‐0.043076    ‐0.006633  ‐0.044105 
  [0.021881]  [0.024803]*    [0.021825]  [0.024671]* 
Higher Secondary  0.020414  ‐0.004898    0.020723  ‐0.008153 
  [0.040746]  [0.030008]    [0.040700]  [0.029900] 
Technical  ‐0.026575  ‐0.059882    ‐0.026999  ‐0.060985 
  [0.022474]  [0.037036]    [0.022454]  [0.036966]* 
Owner  0.017419  ‐0.002083    0.017775  ‐0.001962 
  [0.018805]  [0.016817]    [0.018817]  [0.016772] 
Rice buyer  0.029527  0.138657    0.029777  0.137415 
  [0.047881]  [0.073849]*    [0.047817]  [0.073747]* 
INFORMATION  ‐0.006903  0.024046    ‐0.006546  0.023988 
  [0.015163]  [0.012183]**    [0.015156]  [0.012147]** 
MOVE  0.002865  0.019838    0.002478  0.01935 
  [0.016466]  [0.015561]    [0.016465]  [0.015537] 
Source: Author, based on Vietnam 1992/93 and 1997/98 Household surveys. 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets,   (*) Significant at 10%; (**) significant at 5%; (***) significant at 1% 






Log of unit rice price  Model 2_2: Altmax    Model 2_3: Elevation    Model 2_4: DMCITY 
  1993  1998    1993  1998    1993  1998 
Constant  0.449838  0.984386    0.452812  0.996203    0.470803  1.00874 
  [0.062354]***  [0.042042]***    [0.062374]***  [0.041780]***    [0.062521]***  [0.042901]*** 
DnPrice  0.008368  0.001509    0.008148  0.003562    0.007878  0.00181 
  [0.001811]***  [0.002324]    [0.001740]***  [0.002272]    [0.001774]***  [0.002297] 
Real PC expenditure  0.000011  0.000019    0.000012  0.000019    0.000011  0.000018 
  [0.000013]  [0.000005]***    [0.000013]  [0.000005]***    [0.000013]  [0.000005]*** 
Dn(Real PC expenditure)  ‐0.000003  ‐0.000001    ‐0.000003  ‐0.000002    ‐0.000003  ‐0.000001 
  [0.000001]***  [0.000001]    [0.000001]***  [0.000001]**    [0.000001]***  [0.000001] 
PTC(+)  0.000006  0.000032    ‐0.000005  ‐0.000038    ‐0.001359  ‐0.001152 
  [0.000045]  [0.000040]    [0.000033]  [0.000028]    [0.000754]*  [0.000649]* 
rice area cultivated (M2)  ‐0.000001  0.017751    ‐0.000001  0.018354    ‐0.000001  0.018435 
  [0.000001]  [0.012691]    [0.000001]  [0.012645]    [0.000001]  [0.012660] 
FTC(++)                 
AGE  ‐0.000008  ‐0.000251    ‐0.000012  ‐0.000271    0.000032  ‐0.000215 
  [0.000558]  [0.000498]    [0.000559]  [0.000497]    [0.000557]  [0.000497] 
SEX                 
Female                 
Male  0.001204  ‐0.019628    0.001333  ‐0.020213    ‐0.000094  ‐0.018995 
  [0.018340]  [0.016537]    [0.018344]  [0.016498]    [0.018321]  [0.016504] 
Education                 
No education                 
Primary  ‐0.004367  0.016323    ‐0.004065  0.01613    ‐0.005593  0.015962 
  [0.019064]  [0.014943]    [0.019064]  [0.014870]    [0.019047]  [0.014891] 
Lower Secondary  0.004134  ‐0.041831    0.004656  ‐0.042743    0.002962  ‐0.040534 
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  [0.021164]  [0.022417]*    [0.021168]  [0.022328]*    [0.021157]  [0.022365]* 
Higher Secondary  0.041642  ‐0.04272    0.041702  ‐0.042797    0.040006  ‐0.040726 
  [0.040059]  [0.025563]*    [0.040053]  [0.025488]*    [0.040002]  [0.025517] 
Technical  ‐0.025976  ‐0.005902    ‐0.025951  ‐0.006689    ‐0.026553  ‐0.004713 
  [0.021956]  [0.031311]    [0.021970]  [0.031219]    [0.021928]  [0.031219] 
INFORMATION  ‐0.001023  ‐0.078728    ‐0.000954  ‐0.078103    ‐0.000531  ‐0.077952 
  [0.014852]  [0.037909]**    [0.014854]  [0.037775]**    [0.014830]  [0.037799]** 
MOVE  0.011519  ‐0.029891    0.01193  ‐0.027883    0.012478  ‐0.028052 
  [0.016156]  [0.017070]*    [0.016157]  [0.016976]    [0.016132]  [0.016955]* 
rice buyer 1993  0.03786  0.019421    0.037626  0.020209    0.039018  0.018963 
  [0.047190]  [0.015701]    [0.047275]  [0.015658]    [0.047129]  [0.015656] 
Source: Author, based on Vietnam 1992/93 and 1997/98 Household surveys. 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets,   (*) Significant at 10%; (**) significant at 5%; (***) significant at 1% 
(+) PTC=Proportional Transaction Costs is the size of the population in a 10 km radius 






  Model 2_5: DNTOWN    Model 2_6: POP10    Model 2_7: POP50 
  1993  1998    1993  1998    1993  1998 
Constant  0.450154  1.016373    0.446548  0.951912    0.462661  0.976971 
  [0.062335]***  [0.041663]***    [0.061746]***  [0.041198]***    [0.062206]***  [0.042410]*** 
DnPrice  0.008108  0.003566    0.007979  0.000754    0.008949  0.003112 
  [0.001670]***  [0.002259]    [0.001730]***  [0.002264]    [0.001745]***  [0.002260] 
Real PC expenditure  0.000012  0.000019    0.000012  0.000018    0.000013  0.000018 
  [0.000013]  [0.000005]***    [0.000013]  [0.000005]***    [0.000013]  [0.000005]*** 
Dn(Real PC expenditure)  ‐0.000003  ‐0.000002    ‐0.000003  ‐0.000001    ‐0.000003  ‐0.000002 
  [0.000001]***  [0.000001]*    [0.000001]***  [0.000001]    [0.000001]***  [0.000001]* 
PTC(+)  0.00043  ‐0.016876    0.074706  0.351335    ‐0.002925  0.002385 
  [0.004921]  [0.003983]***    [0.063081]  [0.053021]***    [0.001987]  [0.001634] 
rice area cultivated (M2)  ‐0.000001  0.019269    ‐0.000001  0.022061    ‐0.000001  0.018912 
  [0.000001]  [0.012556]    [0.000001]  [0.012463]*    [0.000001]  [0.012654] 
FTC(++)                 
AGE  ‐0.000006  ‐0.000339    ‐0.000029  ‐0.000233    ‐0.000105  ‐0.00021 
  [0.000558]  [0.000493]    [0.000558]  [0.000489]    [0.000561]  [0.000497] 
SEX                 
Female                 
Male  0.001625  ‐0.020472    0.000766  ‐0.010941    0.00102  ‐0.019518 
  [0.018349]  [0.016371]    [0.018345]  [0.016262]    [0.018319]  [0.016497] 
Education                 
No education                 
Primary  ‐0.003852  0.017479    ‐0.005324  0.015703    ‐0.005554  0.017102 
  [0.019075]  [0.014766]    [0.019078]  [0.014639]    [0.019050]  [0.014883] 
Lower Secondary  0.004976  ‐0.048227    0.002021  ‐0.047117    0.001978  ‐0.045783 
  [0.021188]  [0.022204]**    [0.021247]  [0.021966]**    [0.021175]  [0.022460]** 
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Higher Secondary  0.041624  ‐0.049092    0.039004  ‐0.051213    0.036692  ‐0.046298 
  [0.040075]  [0.025332]*    [0.040071]  [0.025071]**    [0.040113]  [0.025622]* 
Technical  ‐0.025776  ‐0.012351    ‐0.025983  ‐0.016189    ‐0.027963  ‐0.008804 
  [0.021977]  [0.030996]    [0.021954]  [0.030695]    [0.021977]  [0.031276] 
INFORMATION  ‐0.000748  ‐0.079715    ‐0.000068  ‐0.072038    ‐0.000668  ‐0.078485 
  [0.014874]  [0.037491]**    [0.014859]  [0.037172]*    [0.014837]  [0.037779]** 
MOVE  0.012162  ‐0.027896    0.013167  ‐0.018451    0.011146  ‐0.027776 
  [0.016145]  [0.016822]*    [0.016174]  [0.016706]    [0.016136]  [0.016974] 
rice buyer 1993  0.038515  0.015806    0.036494  0.024984    0.042429  0.019298 
  [0.047301]  [0.015552]    [0.047217]  [0.015391]    [0.047253]  [0.015648] 
Source: Author, based on Vietnam 1992/93 and 1997/98 Household surveys. 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets,   (*) Significant at 10%; (**) significant at 5%; (***) significant at 1% 
(+) PTC=Proportional Transaction Costs is the size of the population in a 10 km radius 






  Model 2_8: ROAD    Model 2_9: DLRIVER    Model 2_10: DSRIVER 
  1993  1998    1993  1998    1993  1998 
Constant  0.467456  1.015427    0.45267  0.985467    0.449913  0.99118 
  [0.062104]***  [0.041780]***    [0.062407]***  [0.042332]***    [0.061669]***  [0.041454]*** 
DnPrice  0.008132  0.003105    0.008047  0.002039    0.008588  0.001909 
  [0.001882]***  [0.002214]    [0.001839]***  [0.002286]    [0.001785]***  [0.002284] 
Real PC expenditure  0.000014  0.000019    0.000011  0.000019    0.000012  0.000019 
  [0.000013]  [0.000005]***    [0.000013]  [0.000005]***    [0.000013]  [0.000005]*** 
Dn(Real PC expenditure)  ‐0.000003  ‐0.000002    ‐0.000003  ‐0.000001    ‐0.000003  ‐0.000001 
  [0.000001]***  [0.000001]**    [0.000001]***  [0.000001]    [0.000001]***  [0.000001] 
PTC(+)  ‐0.002849  ‐0.004476    ‐0.000049  0.000345    ‐0.000331  0.000431 
  [0.001405]**  [0.001157]***    [0.000737]  [0.000654]    [0.000216]  [0.000178]** 
rice area cultivated (M2)  ‐0.000001  0.018588    ‐0.000001  0.017471    ‐0.000001  0.0171 
  [0.000001]  [0.012565]    [0.000001]  [0.012700]    [0.000001]  [0.012643] 
FTC(++)                 
AGE  ‐0.000147  ‐0.000382    ‐0.00001  ‐0.000209    0.000013  ‐0.000307 
  [0.000561]  [0.000495]    [0.000559]  [0.000501]    [0.000557]  [0.000497] 
SEX                 
Female                 
Male  0.000606  ‐0.017809    0.001118  ‐0.019983    0.001965  ‐0.020063 
  [0.018286]  [0.016396]    [0.018352]  [0.016529]    [0.018313]  [0.016479] 
Education                 
No education                 
Primary  ‐0.0067  0.013897    ‐0.00425  0.016304    ‐0.004166  0.015588 
  [0.019040]  [0.014790]    [0.019070]  [0.014903]    [0.019029]  [0.014869] 
Lower Secondary  0.002456  ‐0.040641    0.004496  ‐0.041771    0.004152  ‐0.04322 
  [0.021136]  [0.022185]*    [0.021203]  [0.022381]*    [0.021130]  [0.022310]* 
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Higher Secondary  0.038977  ‐0.040938    0.042049  ‐0.041039    0.040234  ‐0.042628 
  [0.039985]  [0.025316]    [0.040048]  [0.025625]    [0.039996]  [0.025453]* 
Technical  ‐0.028043  ‐0.004136    ‐0.025911  ‐0.004025    ‐0.026494  ‐0.009148 
  [0.021924]  [0.030994]    [0.021954]  [0.031384]    [0.021929]  [0.031193] 
INFORMATION  ‐0.001273  ‐0.075346    ‐0.001031  ‐0.077274    ‐0.000177  ‐0.077099 
  [0.014817]  [0.037528]**    [0.014850]  [0.037858]**    [0.014843]  [0.037743]** 
MOVE  0.010346  ‐0.025813    0.011665  ‐0.028494    0.011311  ‐0.027877 
  [0.016136]  [0.016869]    [0.016158]  [0.016975]*    [0.016137]  [0.016931]* 
Rice buyer 1993  0.038164  0.018946    0.037794  0.020141    0.037892  0.019584 
  [0.047067]  [0.015548]    [0.047184]  [0.015684]    [0.047129]  [0.015628] 
Source: Author, based on Vietnam 1992/93 and 1997/98 Household surveys. 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets,   (*) Significant at 10%; (**) significant at 5%; (***) significant at 1% 
(+) PTC=Proportional Transaction Costs, specify in the heading 
 (++) Fixed Transaction Costs 
 
7 Appendix A: Overview of the Economy and
the Rice Sector of Vietnam
1986 is the beginning of the "economic renovation"77 in Vietnam.
These reforms aimed to move the economy from a centrally planned
socialist economy to a more market-oriented economy, thus allow-
ing the market to play a greater role in the allocation of economic
resources. After a slow start, the renovations were accelerated in
the mid-1990s. The core elements of these policies that made it
a success were a combination of liberalization, stabilization, insti-
tutional changes and structural reforms (Kokko, 1997). The main
components of these reforms were the change of the administrative
controls by economics ones, the promotion of agriculture (decollec-
tivization of land, liberalization of fertilizer prices,...), the removal
of price controls on many goods, the liberalization of internal trade,
the restriction of the role of state owned firms in the economy, the
replacement of non-tariff barriers with tariffs and the openness to
foreign investment.
One of the core achievements of these reforms is the entrance of
Vietnam into the world economy. Before 1986, the country traded
mainly with the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance78 - CMEA -
77or doi moi
78The CMEA countries include the former Soviet Union, Eastern European socialist coun-
tries and Cuba.
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countries. International trade was regulated by licences and quotas.,
and the existence of multiple exchange rates made it hard for inter-
national trade to be profitable. With the economic renovation, the
country introduced custom tariffs for the first time in 1988, which
allowed private firms to export in any country without necessarily
having met their export target in the CMEA countries. Quotas,
duties and export taxes were lowered and multiple exchange rates
had been unified and were closer to the market rate. Additionally,
the country introduced the Harmonized System (HS) in 1992 and
published its annual tariff schedules since then. Vietnam moved
deeper in the globalization of its economy via regional and multi-
lateral trading agreements. It became a member of several regional
trading groups including Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN), the economic Free Trade Area (AFTA) and become a
GATT observer by 199479 .
The success of these economic reforms were reflected in the high
average annual growth rate (7%) between 1990 and 2000. Sound
macroeconomics policies stabilized the hyperinflation of the 1980s,
even after the collapse of the CMEA countries. Table A.1 displays
selected macroeconomics indicators for Vietnam from 1991 to 2000.
Inflation dropped from 83 percent in 1991 to 4% in 1999. The ratio
of trade over GDP increased from 67 percent in 1991 to 97 percent in
79also, in 1994, the USA lifted the economic embargo, which opened the American market
to the country.
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2000. The share of oil in the total export fell steadily from 30 percent
to 13 percent between 1992 and 1998. The share of the textile and
garment sectors in total trade increased from 7.7 percent in 1992
to 15.5 percent in 1998. Agriculture, especially the rice sector, was
another fast and impressive growing export. Before the reforms,
Vietnam was a net importer of rice and by 1997, the country turned
out to be the second largest exporter of rice after Thailand. The
success story of the rice sector is mainly due to the agricultural
reforms that are discussed below.
Agricultural reforms began in Vietnam after the reunification of
the country in 1975 but were a failure80 . Before 1981, land belonged
to the State and a cooperative management board controlled the
agricultural production. Following the direction of the board, each
farmer was attributed a work-point which determine his income.
The collectivization was more successful in the North than in the
South and overall the system failed to achieve government objective
and reach rapid productivity growth, mainly because of the lack of
producer incentives and disrupt market mechanisms (Pingali and
Xuan, 1992).
Table A.2 shows the rice production performance between 1966
and 2000. The introduction of the contract method between 1981
and 1987 improved significantly output growth (3.14%) compared
80none of the 15 production targets were met and food production was 31 percent below
target and fell in per capita terms (Minot and Goletti, 2000)
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to 0.46% in the period before. However, several problems subsisted
(failure of the government to collect all the production, lack of land
tenure security) and changes were undertaken in 1988 to overcome
these shortcomings.81
During the "Doi Moi" in the mid 80s, the first resolution was
to move away from the collectivization of farming and to give more
rights (powers) to the farmers. The purchase, ownership and selling
of agricultural products by the farmers were now allowed. Since one
objective of the government was to give more power to the market,
mandatory purchases of agricultural products based on government
sanctions were abolished and more responsibility was given to pri-
vate traders.
Even though Vietnam is one of the largest rice exporters, only less
than a quarter of its area is agricultural land, 50 percent of which is
devoted to rice production. Due to the shape of the country, weather
and rice seasons are different in the South and in the North. In the
South, there are two seasons including a wet (May to November)
and a dry (December to May). In the irrigated areas, there are three
rice crops per year (Summer-Autumn, Autumn-Winter and Winter-
Spring) and there is only one crop in the rained areas (the "main
wet season"). The rice deficit north region has four seasons and
double cropping is the norm. The rice production in this region are
81Resolution #10
130
the Winter-crop, the Main-season-crop and the Summer-autumn.
Two regions produced more than two-thirds of the rice produc-
tion in the country: the Red River Delta in the North and the
Mekong Delta River in the South. In the Red River Delta region,
farms are small (0.25 hectare on average) and intensively cultivated
and the cultivativation is more labor-intensive (246 person-days-
season per hectare in 1998). About 95 percent of the rural house-
holds grew rice on 81 percent of the arable land and labor hired
for the rice production represented 5 percent of the total labor use
in the Red River Delta. This region represented 18 percent of the
country rice production. In the south, the Mekong Delta utilized
large scale rice cultivation in larger farms (1.26 hectares on aver-
age), and a lower cropping intensity, which accounted for more than
half of the country rice production. Rice cultivation in this region is
less labor-intensive with 96 person-days-season per hectare in 1998
and the labor hired the Mekong Delta represented about 33 to 39
percent of the total labor in the rice production (IFPRI, 1996). The
remaining regions in the country, five, are lacking in terms of rice
production.
The market structure of a commodity, like rice, is much more
complicated than for cocoa or coffee. Besides being a tradable good,
rice is also subject to internal consumption. Thus, the government
has to find the right balance between export to generate foreign cur-
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rency and auto-consumption to satisfy basic needs. The rice market
structure includes farm-level marketing, milling sector, wholesale
marketing, domestic retail marketing, and the rice export. A 1996
IFPRI survey found that more than 95 percent of paddy purchases
were done by private assemblers. Assemblers sell their paddy to
millers (Mekong Delta) or to wholesalers after they have the paddy
milled (other regions). The rice milling sector processes the paddy
and sell their output to the wholesalers or to the state owned en-
terprises. Wholesale marketing is an important step linking other
categories of traders. It includes private wholesalers and SOEs. The
latter have the legal monopoly of exporting the rice. The domestic
retailers are the last in the internal trade of rice. They basically buy
the rice from the wholesalers and sell it to the population.
Internally, there are two main sources of price volatility other
than risks due to openness: inflation and seasonality. Sound macro-
economic policies reduce inflation in the 1990s and then the vari-
ability of the prices. Over the period of 1989- 1996, the real price
of paddy and rice decreased, by 4.3 percent and 3.2 percent respec-
tively. If this trend satisfied the rice’s consumer, the story may be
different for the rice’s producers. The export quota is one factor
that prevented the domestic price from fully adjusting to the inter-
national price by the imposition an implicit tax. On the aggregate
level, seasonality price volatility is low (10 percent), while at the
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district level, it may reach 30 percent.
In Vietnam, restrictions on internal trade of rice were implicit
and took the form of heavy administrative procedures. In 1995, the
rice’s price difference between the north and the south was Dong 709
(US cent 6) per kilogram, of which only 42 percent can be explain by
the transportation cost.82 However, the restriction concerning the
rice export is more explicit. The official argument is to ensure ade-
quate domestic supplies and reduce price volatility. The government
controlled the rice export through the use of a quota83 . Roughly, be-
tween 1990 and 1995, these quotas were equivalent to an export tax
around 25 percent.84 The quota for rice has been lifted, but ex-
port licence, were still required and export taxes on rice were only
1 percent.
By the mid 1990s, the government removed most of the quota
and production and exports increase. From being a net importer of
rice, Vietnam turns itself into the second world largest rice exporter.
Table A.3 displays the rice production, area cultivated, yield, rice’s
export and import between 1976 and 2000. Over this period, the
country almost multiplies its rice’s production by three (11.4millions
82The rice price was D2,917 (US cent 26) per kilogram in the north and D2,208 (US cent
20) per kilogram in the south. The cost of transport of rice was estimated at D300 (US cent
3) per kilogram (IFPRI, 1996)
83The quota is binding if the internal or domestic price is below the border price and has
a similar effect as an export tax.
84Vietnam exports primarily indica rice, mainly of intermediate and low quality. As docu-
mented in Nielsen (2002), Vietnam typically sells its intermediate and low-quality indica rice
at a significant discount price relative to Thai counterparts.
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tons in 1976 to 32.5 millions tons in 2000). This spectacular increase
in rice production was due mainly to the increase of the rice yield,
which double during this period from 2.1 tons/ha in 1979 to 4.25
tons/ha in 2000. Cultivated areas, at a lower level, explained also
the increase of rice’s production. In terms of international rice trade,
Vietnam moved from being a net importer of rice, with an import of
0.14 million tons in 1984, to being the second world largest exporter,
with a rice’s export of 3.5 millions tons in 2000. Since the rice’s
production is done in rural area, which account for about 80 percent
of the population, the country experiences a reduction of its poverty






  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000 
                     
  (Annual growth %) 
  GDP  6  9  8  9  10  9  8  6  5  7 
  Agriculture, value added   2  7  3  3  5  4  4  4  5  5 
  Industry, value added  8  13  13  13  14  14  13  8  8  10 
  Services, etc., value added   8  7  9  10  10  9  7  5  2  5 
                     
  Exports of goods and services  30  25  9  52  25  56  0  4  23  25 
  Imports of goods and services  ‐6  19  42  61  40  44  23  3  1  34 
                      
  Inflation, consumer prices ( %)  83  38  8  9  17  6  3  7  4  ‐2 
  Official exchange rate (VND/US$)  10037  11202  10641  10966  11038  11033  11683  13268  13943  14168 
                     
  (% of GDP) 
  Agriculture, value added   40  34  30  27  27  28  26  26  25  25 
  Industry, value added   24  27  29  29  29  30  32  32  34  37 
     Manufacturing, value added  13  15  15  15  15  15  16  17  18  19 
  Services, etc., value added   36  39  41  44  44  43  42  42  40  39 
                     
  Trade  67  74  66  77  75  93  94  97  103  113 
     Exports of goods and services  31  35  29  34  33  41  43  45  50  55 
     Imports of goods and services  36  39  37  43  42  52  51  52  53  57 
                     
  GDP (bill cst 2000 US$)  15.9  17.3  18.7  20.3  22.3  24.4  26.3  27.9  29.2  31.2 
  GDP per capita (cst 2000 US$)  235  251  266  284  305  328  349  364  377  397 
  GNI per capita, (curr US$)  110  130  170  200  250  300  340  350  360  380 





    Growth (%)   
  Cultivated area  Yield per Ha  Total Production 
1966‐75  1.59  2.22  3.80 
1976‐80  1.02  ‐0.55  0.46 
1981‐1987  ‐0.09  3.23  3.14 
1988‐1996  2.39  2.80  5.19 
1997‐2000  2.19  3.12  5.97 
    Source: Agricultural Statistic, General Statistic Office, Hanoi (2000) from Hai (2002) 














Year  (1,000tons)  (1,000ha)  (Kg/ha)  (Mil.)  (Kg)  (1,000tons)  (1,000tons) 
1976  11,827  5,297  2,233  49.2  241  148  0 
1977  10,597  5,469  1,938  50.4  210  196  0 
1978  9,790  5,463  1,792  51.4  190  285  0 
1979  11,363  5,485  2,072  52.5  217  320  0 
1980  11,647  5,600  2,080  53.7  217  210  33 
1981  12,415  5,652  2,197  55  226  12  0 
1982  14,390  5,711  2,520  56.2  256  197  0 
1983  14,743  5,611  2,628  57.4  257  42  0 
1984  15,506  5,675  2,732  58.7  264  140  0 
1985  15,875  5,704  2,783  59.9  265  336  59 
1986  16,003  5,689  2,813  61.1  262  482  125 
1987  15,103  5,589  2,702  62.4  242  323  120 
1988  17,000  5,726  2,969  63.7  267  465  91 
1989  18,996  5,896  3,222  64.7  295  55  1,372 
1990  19,225  6,028  3,189  66.2  290  20  1,478 
1991  19,622  6,301  3,114  67.6  289  6  1,061 
1992  21,590  6,423  3,361  69.3  312  0  1,953 
1993  22,836  6,559  3,482  71  321  0  1,649 
1994  23,528  6,598  3,566  72.5  324  0  1,962 
1995  24,926  6,766  3,684  73.9  337  0  2,025 
1996  26,397  7,021  3,760  75.2  351  0  3,047 
1997  27,524  7,100  3,880  76.7  359  0  3,682 
1998  29,142  7,362  3,990  78.1  373  0  3,793 
1999  31,390  7,465  4,205  79.5  395  0  4,550 
2000  32,554  7,655  4,253  80.9  402  0  3,500 
Source: General Statistic Office, Hanoi, 2001 
Note. (1) Cultivated area: total area that yielded two or three rice crops per year (2) Yield: average rice yield per hectare of cultivated area. 
8 Appendix B: Presentation of the 1992/93 and
1997/98 Surveys Design
Overview: Vietnam85 implemented its first VietnamLiving Stan-
dards Survey (VLSS) in 1992-93 and a second one in 1997-98. Both
VLSS surveys were funded by UNDP and Swedish International
Development Authority (SIDA). The survey was part of the Liv-
ing Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) household surveys con-
ducted in a number of developing countries with technical assistance
from the World Bank.
The second VLSS was designed to provide an up-to-date source
of data on households to be used in policy design, monitoring of liv-
ing standards and evaluation of policies and programs. The timing
of the second VLSS approximately five years after the first allows
analysis of medium term trends in living standards as a large part
of the questionnaire is the same in both surveys.
Sample size: The target sample size selected for the 1997-98
Vietnam Living Standards Household Survey (VLSSII) was 6000
households. The majority of the sample was comprised of the house-
holds interviewed from the 150 communes selected in 1992-93 with
the first VLSS survey (4800 households). Households are defined as
85This appendix draws heavily from World Bank (1994, 2001).
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people living and eating meals together in the same dwelling. In
most cases there is only one household per dwelling as people who
live together usually eat together. There were no clear indications
in the various manuals on what to do if more than one household
lived within one dwelling.
The sample in 1992-93 was a self-weighted sample drawn from
all areas of Vietnam, which means that each household in Viet Nam
had the same probability of being selected. The weight or expan-
sion factor for each unit is then 1. The overall sampling frame was
stratified into two groups urban and rural, with sampling carried
out separately in each group (strata). According to the 1989 cen-
sus, about 20% of Vietnamese households lived in urban areas so
the sample stratification ensured that 20% of selected households
also came from urban areas. Within each of the two strata, a list
of communes was drawn up province by province from east to west
and north to south. The selection of communes within each list was
done to ensure that they were spread out evenly among all provinces
in Vietnam.
Primary Sampling Unit (PSU): Within each province in Vietnam,
rural areas can be broken down into districts, districts broken down
into communes and communes broken down into villages or hamlets.
Urban areas consist of cities, provincial and small towns. Small
towns are usually small areas and are divided into wards, and wards
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divided into blocks. Large cities and provincial towns are usually
divided into districts, then wards and finally blocks. There were
approximately 10,000 possible PSUs in 1992-93 (and 10,331 in 1998.)
The average population in each PSU was approximately 6,500.
Sampling stages: The VLSS sample was drawn in three stages
with communes/wards and small towns chosen as the primary sam-
pling unit as that was the lowest administrative unit for which the
estimates of population in 1992 was available. A total of 150 com-
munes/wards were selected systematically out of the 10,000 in all of
Vietnam with probability of selection proportional to their popula-
tion size. As some communes are quite large in size, logistically it
would have been difficult to interview 32 households selected ran-
domly within each commune/ward. Instead, population figures for
each village/block were compiled from the selected communes to
select two villages/blocks randomly with probability proportional
to their population size. Finally, the third stage involved listing
all households within each selected village/block and selecting 20
households (16 for the sample and 4 extras if it became necessary to
replace a selected household). As there were two stages of sampling
for which the sampling unit could be called a cluster, the term com-
mune/ward and village/block are used instead of cluster to designate
the different units.
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For the sample to reach 6000 households in 1998, an additional
1200 households were required. This was done by selecting house-
holds from the total sample of the 1995 Multi-Purpose Household
Survey (MPHS) of the General Statistical Office (GSO). In order to
provide an adequate sample to disaggregate results into the seven
major regions for rural areas and three categories of urban domains,
the selection of the additional households was not proportional to
population, but instead was chosen so that the total sample of 6000
households over-sampled specific domains. It is essential in doing
analysis to utilize the sample weights in the data to avoid biases in
results due to over sampling of urban areas, and certain regions of
the country.
Again, for survey implementation reasons, the households are
not randomly selected throughout each domain, but are selected in
groups of two villages/blocks in a commune/ward, and 16 house-
holds per village/block (15 households for the MPHS part of the
sample). The final sample is therefore made up of 4704 households
from the VLSS 1992-93 communes, and 1290 households from the
MPHS survey communes for a total of 5994 households.
The household listings used for sample selection were provided by
the local authorities, and in most cases consisted only of long-term
registered households. As migration has increased in recent years,
especially in urban areas and the Central Highlands, this could lead
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to some biases in the results as temporarily registered households
would not have had a chance of being selected.
Weights or Expansion Factors86: Notice that the 1992/93 sur-
vey has been self-weigthed, which means that the weight for each
observation unit is 1. In order to make estimates relating to groups
of domains, or to the whole sample for the 1997/98 survey, the data
must be weighted in order to correct the bias due to deliberate over-
or under-sampling. This manipulation increases the sampling error
slightly for nationwide estimates but allows one to do more pre-
cise analysis within each domain. The formula for calculating the
weights (or expansion factors) consists of the following factors to
deal with the probability of the household being sampled at the dif-
ferent stages of sampling: (i) the probability of being in the VLSS or
MPHS part of the sample; (ii) the probability of the commune/ward
being selected out of the domain (strata) (iii) the probability of each
of the two villages/blocks being selected out of the whole Commune
/ ward; (iv) the probability of 16 (15 for MPHS) households being
sampled out of the village/block; (v) a factor to adjust for changes
in number of households in the village/block between the original
sample selection year and the time of the survey in 1997-98.
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